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EXPARTE YOUNG AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS, 1890-1917
Edward A. Purcell, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
M ORE than a century after the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte
Young,' judges and commentators still debate its meaning and
significance. 2 Writing for the Young majority, Justice Rufus Peckham declared
that his opinion contained "no new invention" and was rooted firmly in
precedents going back to the Marshall Court.3 In contrast, the sole dissenter,
Justice John Marshall Harlan, charged that the opinion "departs" from "principles
previously announced" and "would work a radical change in our governmental
system.",4 The views of subsequent commentators have ranged freely between
those interpretive antipodes.
5
* Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor, New York Law School. The author wishes to
thank the members of the New York Law School Faculty Colloquium for helpful comments and
suggestions, especially Stephen J. Ellmann, Doni Gewirtzman, Richard A. Matasar, David
Schoenbrod, and Donald Zeigler, and to thank New York Law School students Jared Kagan, Sara
Mirsky, and Christina Trapani for their excellent research assistance.
1. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
2. E.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (justices divide into three
differing groups in explaining the Young doctrine).
3. Young, 209 U.S. at 167.
4. Id. at 169, 175 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5. Critics of Young include the following: DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION 1N THE
SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 54 (1990) ("Young rejected sound
precedent ... [and supported a new doctrine] that the Court had manufactured out of whole cloth.");
James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There's a Remedy, There's a Right: A Skeptic 's
Critique of Ex parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215, 219 (2004) (arguing that Young's reasoning
"is untenable," and its "fiction permits what the Framers of the Constitution rejected in 1787");
Charles Warren, Federal & State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 375 (1930) (stating
that Young "clearly violates the spirit and theory" of the federal anti-injunction act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283, and "directly promotes collisions" between federal and state "sovereignties"). Defenders
of the decision include the following: CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 292
(4th ed. 1983) (stating that Young is "indispensable to the establishment of constitutional
government and the rule of law"); Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109,
1139 (1969) (stating that Young recognized that "the Constitution is an integral aspect of the
substantive law" and that the Constitution "gives the right to the remedy"); Daniel Meltzer, The
Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 37, 38 n.178 (noting that
Young "grew" from a recognized "nineteenth-century tradition" and provided an established
remedy that was "required, or at least inspired, by the Due Process Clause").
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Perhaps the only conclusion that commentators have generally agreed on is
that, whatever its legal standing, Young was highly controversial as a political
matter. Progressives generally denounced it, while their adversaries praised it.
6
Those contrasting views, not surprisingly, had less to do with Young's technical
reasoning than with its practical consequences. Young affirmed a muscular
power in the federal courts to enjoin the enforcement of state laws and regulatory
actions, and commentators divided for the most part according to their views
about the desirability of that result.7 Had Young come down three years after
Brown v. Board of Education8 rather than three years after Lochner v. New York, 9
the initial battle lines would have been strikingly different.10 Indeed, Young's
legal reputation over the past century has risen and fallen, and its legal meaning
has broadened and contracted, with the tides of American politics and the shifting
political goals of its interpreters.
Instead of examining either Young's doctrinal pedigree or its political
salience, however, I wish to consider the case from a different perspective. This
article focuses on Young's place in the Court's jurisprudence at a particular time
in American history and its role in the institutional evolution of American law
and government. From that perspective, Young's most important and enduring
significance emerges more clearly. The decision was a key component in the
transformation of the federal judiciary that the Supreme Court orchestrated
between approximately 1890 and the First World War. The case did not mark a
radical, or perhaps even substantial, break with the past; instead, it helped extend
the trendlines that the Court had begun shaping after the post-Reconstruction
settlement of the 1870s and 1880s. Ratifying, solidifying, and accelerating those
trendlines, Young helped create a newly powerful and activist federal judiciary
that emerged at the turn of the twentieth century and continued to operate into the
twenty-first. Young was not, in other words, a towering landmark commanding
the jurisprudential countryside but rather, to switch metaphors, one integral
component in a complex turbine that generated heightened levels of federal
judicial power.
6. See Eridania Prez-Jaquez, Constitutionalizing State Sovereign Immunity: Ex Parte Young
and the Conservative Wing's Attempt to Restore Federalism and Empower States, 51 RUTGERS L.
REV. 229, 243, 260 (1999).
7. E.g., Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge
District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REv. 101, 111-18 (2008). Solimine pointed out that Young came
down the same year that the Court announced three other decisions that outraged Progressives. Id.
at 113 n.60. The three were the Employers' Liabilities Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 503-04 (1908)
(invalidating the first Federal Employers Liability Act); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180
(1908) (voiding a federal statute that made "yellow dog" contracts unenforceable); and Loewe v.
Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 302 (1908) (applying the Sherman Antitrust Act to labor unions).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
10. E.g., OwEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 4-6 (1978).
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II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 1890-1917
During the years from 1890 to 1917 the Supreme Court transformed the
federal judiciary to meet the new challenges of a tumultuous and centralizing
industrial age. The changes it made ranged across the doctrinal landscape, and
their cumulative impact accelerated the nationalization and centralization of
American law, government, and society. The Court imposed new national and
centrally enforced limitations on governmental power, tightened federal judicial
control over the states, extended the reach of congressional and presidential
power, expanded the authority of federal judges to make national law,
reconceptualized the role of the lower federal courts, and reoriented the
jurisdiction of the entire federal judiciary to ensure the more effective
enforcement of national law.
That transformation required more than a quarter of a century to complete,
though neither its beginning nor ending was rigidly marked off from the periods
that preceded and followed it.' l It had deep doctrinal roots in the Constitution
and the decisions of the Marshall Court, while the Fourteenth Amendment
provided a pivotal constitutional mandate that undergirded the transformation.
The expansion of federal jurisdiction that came with Republican Reconstruction
also played a critical role, especially the grant of general "federal question"
jurisdiction in 1875.12 Still, however, through the tumultuous 1870s and 1880s,
powerful social and political forces--congressional threats against the national
courts, continued sectional bitterness and persisting racial strife, traditional ideas
about states' rights and the limited nature of federal power, and growing political
support for the nation's lurch toward a racially repressive and "states' rights"-
oriented post-Reconstruction settlement-combined to cabin tightly the
interpretations that judges placed on those constitutional and statutory authorities.
Indeed, increasing Democratic and Southern strength in Congress ratified the
11. There were hints of the future in the 1880s, for example, and traces of the past in the
1890s. Hints included the foreshadowing of substantive due process in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, 661 (1887), the determination that corporations were "persons" within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause in Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394, 410 (1886), and the
Court's occasional recognition of implied federal rights of action both at law and in equity in, for
example, the Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 300-01, 308, 309, 311, 317 (1885). See Ann
Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 449
(1987) (discussing the Court's use of implied rights of action). Traces of the past included the
Court's apparent backtracking on its earliest substantive-due-process decision (Chicago,
Minneapolis & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890)) in Budd v. New York, 143
U.S. 517 (1892), and Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391 (1894), and its continuing efforts to
limit federal jurisdiction and in some areas to favor diversity jurisdiction over federal-question
jurisdiction. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 266-73 (1992).
12. Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. In the long run, Professor
William M. Wiecek explained, "all the jurisdictional statutes of the Reconstruction era laid the
groundwork for the judicial self assertiveness of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries."
William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 333, 334 (1969). See generally STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION
POLITICS (1968).
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emerging post-Reconstruction settlement and produced the restrictive Judiciary
Act of 1887-88 that trimmed the federal judiciary's jurisdiction and induced the
Court to concentrate for the next few years on limiting rather than expanding that
jurisdiction. 13
Similarly, the period's ending date-the First World War-marked no final
moment when the role and doctrines of the federal courts became frozen in time.
The decades after 1917 witnessed numerous shifts as new social problems,
political alignments, and judicial appointments periodically led the Court to alter
its policies and readjust its doctrines. Change was unavoidable. Indeed, the
period from 1890 to 1917 contained its own hesitations and inconsistencies, for
during those tumultuous years the Court, like the country at large, confronted
rapid social changes and unnerving new challenges that often left it anxious,
divided, and uncertain. In spite of all such qualifications, however, the years
from 1890 to 1917 marked a distinctive and critical period in the Court's history,
one in which it worked a substantial transformation in the role, orientation, and
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
By 1890 the crises created by slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction
had passed, resolved for the time in a post-Reconstruction settlement that turned
race-related issues into "local" matters, thereby freeing national power to address
the new problems of industrialization without implicating bitterly divisive and
potentially deadlocking racial issues. 14 It was in 1890 that the Court, looking
backward, solidified the post-Reconstruction settlement with its decision in Hans
v. Louisiana.15 There, it construed the Eleventh Amendment broadly to limit
federal judicial power over the states,16 while it also reaffirmed the principle
established in Munn v. Illinois17 that the legislature, not the judiciary, exercised
final authority over state economic regulation.18 But it was also in 1890 when the
Court, looking forward, began-on the very same day it decided Hans-to
narrow the Eleventh Amendment by holding it inapplicable to counties 19 and
then-a bare three weeks later-flatly contradicted Hans by announcing that it
13. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 56-102 (1928); PURCELL, supra note 11, at 266.
14. Pamela S. Karlan, Contracting the Thirteenth Amendment: Hodges v. United States, 85
B.U. L. REV. 783, 794-809 (2005); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans
v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History, and Federal Courts, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 2030-
33 (2003). In 1923 Charles Warren, the preeminent historian of the Court in the early twentieth
century, acknowledged the connection between the Court's growing power and prestige and its
willingness to allow the white South to handle "the race question" as it wished. The Court's
decisions affirming the post-Reconstruction settlement "were most fortunate," Warren explained.
"They largely eliminated from National politics the negro question which had so long embittered
Congressional debates; they relegated the burden and the duty of protecting the negro to the States,
to whom they properly belonged; and they served to restore confidence in the National Court in the
Southern States." 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 1856-
1918, at 330 (1923).
15. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
16. Id. at 10.
17. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
18. Hans, 134 U.S. at 21.
19. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 531 (1890).
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was the judiciary after all, and not the legislature, that had final word on issues of
state economic regulation. 20 Thus, 1890 can be seen as a high point of both the
Eleventh Amendment and state legislative power and a low point of both the
Fourteenth Amendment and federal judicial power. Equally, it can be seen as the
year that the Court began to reverse those respective high and low points.
21
Those twin and complementary reversals lay at the heart of the transformation.
By 1917 those reversals and the many related changes that combined with
them to transform the federal judiciary were essentially complete. There would
always be critics of the transformation's results, and in subsequent decades such
critics would sometimes gain power and seek to reorient the federal judiciary and
reshape its powers. Although successors changed the contours and applications
of many doctrines, they seldom succeeded in making more than narrow-gaged
alterations in the fundamental institutional framework that the transformation had
established.22 Indeed, rather than seeking to substantially narrow the federal
judiciary's powers, those who ascended to the high bench usually wound up
seeking to redirect those powers toward their own new and different national
goals. Succeeding generations witnessed both expansions in the scope of federal
law and changes in the social interests it served, and with them changes in both
the social consequences of federal judicial power and the political coalitions that
supported its exercise. Regardless of later developments, however, the basic
institutional results of the transformation remained firmly in place.23 The federal
judiciary's broad supervisory authority and entrenched institutional status
20. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418,458 (1890).
21. Purcell, supra note 14, at 1962-75, 2039-55. The Court imposed other limits on the states
in 1890. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 125 (1890) (holding that states cannot bar in-
state sales of out-of-state liquor in its original package); Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U.S. 161, 166
(1890) (holding that states cannot "lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form").
22. The doctrine of Young, for example, was repeatedly criticized over the years and often
remolded to broaden or narrow its scope. E.g., Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State
Prosecutions: The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 641-42 (1979); Aviam
Soifer & H.C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV.
1141, 1148-49 & n.49 (1975). But even in narrowing periods the Court carefully preserved the
doctrine, held it ready for use when necessary, and tailored it to serve the national goals and values
of the majority justices. Similarly, the "general federal common law" played an important role in
the transformation, and the post-New Deal Court abolished that law in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The abolition, however, did not substantially change the
institutional results of the transformation and, in fact, ultimately strengthened them. See Edward A.
Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and Social Change
Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 21, 75-76 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008).
23. For more recent debates over the practical significance of federal judicial power, see
generally PHILLIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES AND
STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS (1988); MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY
MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURT REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998); FIss,
supra note 10; LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE
AND THE SCHOOLS (1976); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977);
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991);
Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS
RUN GOVERNMENT (2003); PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR
OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983).
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continued to make it a regular, powerful, and often decisive player in American
politics and policymaking.
24
A. Sources of the Transformation
Powerful centripetal forces drove the transformation. The economy's rapid
expansion and centralization seemed to require national law to foster an
emerging national market and address the spreading consequences of
industrialization. Energizing moral issues that transcended state lines-the
"Mormon Question," prohibition, prostitution, gambling, and child labor-
generated additional pressures to extend national regulation into areas
traditionally subject to state authority.25 Those nationalizing forces, moreover,
required the expansion of federal law not only to order ever larger areas of social
and economic activity 26 but also to ensure that the laws of the states-wherever
they remained in control-were cabined by national rules that limited their
extraterritorial reach and protected states from the intrusion of other states'
laws. 27  Those pressures combined to invert the practical significance of the
nation's federal structure, turning it in many areas from an admired bulwark of
diversity and localism into a troubling obstacle to order, efficiency, and
uniformity.
Equally important, fundamental institutional considerations shaped the
transformation's direction and content. The upsurge in responsive state and
federal regulatory activity placed intense pressure on the Court to honor two
fundamental principles: first, that there were constitutional limits on
24. It was revealing that, at the end of the period, an unprecedented political and ideological
battle erupted over a Supreme Court nominee. In early 1916 President Woodrow Wilson
nominated Louis D. Brandeis to the Court in an effort to rally Progressive support behind his
reelection campaign, and the nation's anti-Progressive forces combined to launch an
unprecedented, organized, and vicious assault against the candidate. ALDEN L. TODD, JUSTICE ON
TRIAL: THE CASE OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 37-39 (1964). By 1916, the new role, power, and impact
of the federal judiciary had become clear to everyone.
25. See, e.g., SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 57 (2002).
26. The Court had sought to protect a burgeoning national market since the middle of the
nineteenth century, and its efforts intensified in the century's last quarter. TONY FREYER, FORUMS
OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND BUSINESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 99-114 (1979); Howard
Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in
the United States, 1879-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 512-19 (2002); Charles W. McCurdy,
American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875-1890, 38 J. ECON.
HIST. 631, 648-49 (1978).
27. E.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (invalidating a state statute that barred the
state's citizens from contracting with out-of-state insurance companies that had not registered in the
state); Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905) (holding that a state cannot tax property
beyond its jurisdiction). See also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 182-84 (2000) (discussing how nineteenth-century developments
in communications, technology, and the burgeoning national market led the Court to use
constitutional provisions to limit the extraterritorial application of state law).
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governmental power and, second, that the courts would enforce those limits.2 8 At
the same time, however, the rapid increase in suits challenging regulatory actions
meant that the Court itself was unable to review more than a handful of such
cases. Recognizing the burdens that a rapidly swelling docket placed on the
Court, Congress created a new tier of intermediate federal courts of appeals in
1891 and began to shift the Court's appellate jurisdiction from a mandatory to a
discretionary basis. 29 The new intermediate federal appeals courts, however,
could only hear cases brought originally in the federal trial courts, 30 and the
Supreme Court's greater discretionary control over its own docket did not alter
the fact that it was still unable to review more than a minuscule number of the
cases that pressed for its attention. 3 1 In that institutional context, a widespread
and often intense suspicion of state courts, the intensifying desire of national
corporations for federal forums, and the growing importance of trial-court fact-
finding in suits challenging administrative actions32 combined to inspire a
growing conviction among the justices that the jurisdiction of the federal trial
courts should be reshaped to enable them more easily and commonly to hear the
nationally important cases that seemed to warrant federal adjudication.3 3 A deep
faith in the integrity, independence, and capabilities of the national judiciary-
fervent among the comfortable classes, the legal profession's eastern elite, and
28. From the broadest perspective, the turn-of-the-century Court's principal accomplishment
was to affirm those two principles, reshape the federal judiciary to serve them more effectively, and
expand the reach and role of national law generally, not to apply those limits to invalidate most
legislative responses to new social conditions. On the varied motives and purposes attributed to the
justices, see, e.g., OWEN Fiss, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 46-50
(1993) (maintaining that judges sought to define inherent limits on government arising from the
nation's fundamental "social contract"); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE
RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 86-95 (asserting that judges
sought to minimize factional conflict by rejecting special or unequal "class legislation"); David E.
Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 31-35 (2003) (arguing that judges sought to protect the
fundamental liberties of Americans); Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due
Process in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1505-29 (1998) (contending that judges
sought to protect "normal" and "ordinary" activities of life from administrative control).
29. The Judiciary Act of 1891 (the "Evarts Act"), 26 Stat. 826, 828 (1891), created
intermediate federal appellate courts and made cases coming from those courts reviewable in the
Supreme Court only by discretionary writ of certiorari. Further, in 1914 and 1916 Congress made
large numbers of decisions in the state courts that involved federal claims reviewable in the Court
only by certiorari. Act of Dec. 23, 1914, 38 Stat. 790 (1914); Act of Sept. 6, 1916, 39 Stat. 726
(1916). In 1925 the "Judges Bill" made virtually all of the Court's docket discretionary. Act of
Feb. 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 939, 937 (1925).
30. Evarts Act, 26 Stat. at 826.
3 1. Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliviera, Reforming the Brazilian Federal Court: A
Comparative Approach, 5 WASH U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 99, 117 nn.85-87 (2006).
32. This was especially true in complex ratemaking cases. "Few cases are more difficult or
perplexing than those which involve an inquiry whether the rates prescribed by a state legislature
for the carriage of passengers and freight are unreasonable." Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v.
Tompkins, 176 U.S. 167, 172 (1900). See generally Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner
Era: Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187,
194-232 (1984) (examining problems of rate regulation and the Court's treatment of the issue).
33. See PURCELL, supra note 11, at 262-91; Siegel, supra note 32, at 209, 220.
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most of those who sat on the federal bench-confirmed the wisdom of such a
change.
Further, the growing political militance, escalating social turmoil, and
deepening economic distress that scarred the 1870s and 1880s and then
dominated the 1890s generated a growing belief that the national government
needed to take forceful action to safeguard the nation's established social and
economic order.34 Many Americans came to see the vigorous assertion of federal
judicial authority as a particularly desirable and effective way to achieve that
goal. Thus, in response to those varied considerations and pressures, the Court
began in the 1890s to expand the scope of national law, strengthen its own ability
to supervise the nation's legal system, and alter the rules of federal jurisdiction to
ensure that legally, socially, and economically important cases could more easily
be brought in the federal trial courts.
The justices were, in fact, acutely aware of the importance of ensuring that
the lower federal courts were available as initial forums for resolving important
national issues. Concurring in the Court's initial acceptance of what would
become substantive due process, Justice Samuel Miller-surely no advocate of
centralization and nationalization-readily accepted the principle that
"oppressive" state regulatory legislation necessitated a judicial remedy,
"especially in the courts of the United States. ' '35 Throughout the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, bitter battles for forum control raged between
national corporations and their private and governmental adversaries, swamping
the courts with fiercely contested jurisdictional disputes that, by the beginning of
the twentieth century, accounted for almost twenty percent of the cases heard in
the federal circuit courts. 36 "That the parties preferred to take the subject matter
of the litigation into the Federal courts, instead of proceeding in one of the courts
of the State," the Court declared in 1908, "is not wrongful. '" 37 The next year it
reaffirmed that principle even more emphatically: "The right of a party plaintiff
to choose a Federal court where there is a choice cannot be properly denied," the
justices insisted, and the exercise of federal jurisdiction in such cases "cannot be
the subject of proper criticism. ' 38
Congress further spurred the transformation. Beginning with the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887, it became increasingly active in regulating the national
economy, imposing limitations on corporate activities, and addressing the social
consequences of industrialization. 39  Although the Court sometimes checked
those efforts, over the quarter century after 1890 it approved ever broader
34. See, e.g., ROBERT V. BRUCE, 1877: YEAR OF VIOLENCE, at 314-16 (1959); SAMUEL T.
MCSEVENEY, THE POLITICS OF DEPRESSION 35-38, 41, 87-97, 176-80 (1972); Gregory Bush,
Containing the GildedAge Mob, 19 REVS. AM. HIST. 48, 52-53 (1991).
35. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 459 (1890) (Miller, J.,
concurring).
36. PURCELL, supra note 11, at 277. On the battles for forum control in the turn-of-the-century
courts, see, for example, id. at 87-126.
37. In re Metro. Ry. Receivership, 208 U.S. 90, 111 (1908).
38. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909).
39. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
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assertions of congressional power.40 In 1905 it stretched the Commerce Clause
by adopting the expansive stream-of-commerce doctrine,4 1 and in 1914 it relied
on "the complete and paramount authority of Congress" over interstate
commerce to approve the national legislature's control over wholly intrastate
railroad rates "in all matters" bearing "a close and substantial relation to
interstate traffic., 42  Generalizing a series of early twentieth-century cases
upholding congressional power to prohibit certain products from interstate
commerce, the Court announced in 1913 the expansive principle that the
Commerce Clause gave Congress a plenary "police" power over all goods and
services involved in interstate commerce.
43
Broader and more frequent exercises of congressional power, and their usual
acceptance by the Court, did far more than expand the powers of Congress. They
also expanded the federal judiciary's power. First, the steady multiplication of
congressional acts meant that federal courts would increasingly construe and
apply a spreading national statutory law. Thus, as the authoritative exponent of
federal law, the Supreme Court would inevitably exert a growing influence over
ever larger areas of American life.
Second, the general nature of some congressional statutes, and especially
their frequent incorporation of common-law terms, gave the federal judiciary
considerable leeway in determining their reach. The common-law language of
the Sherman Antitrust Act, for example, effectively delegated to the federal
courts a new authority for shaping national policy through the guise of statutory
construction.44 When the Court adopted its "rule of reason" in 1911, it in effect
announced that the federal courts would decide for themselves exactly when
"combinations" were unlawful and would thus exercise a sweeping power to
control the course and form of corporate consolidations and to supervise their
organization of the national economy. 45 The very next year, moreover, the Court
further broadened the act's scope and its own power when it effectively denied
the relevance of state law to the act's reach by ruling that state corporation law
could not provide defenses to federal antitrust prosecutions.4 6 Indeed, although
40. Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV. 821, 831
(2005) (noting that between 1890 and 1919 the Court heard 158 challenges to federal statutes and
struck down only 23 of them, "giving Congress a success rate of eighty-five percent").
41. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 399 (1905).
42. Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914).
43. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 319, 323 (1913).
44. The Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). Similarly, the Safety Appliance
Act, 27 Stat. 531 (1893), amended 29 Stat. 85 (1896), and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35
Stat. 65 (1908), amended 36 Stat. 291 (1910), required the federal courts to construe basic
common-law terms and to determine in large part the extent to which federal law would replace
state tort law. See PURCELL, supra note 11, at 163-72.
45. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 106, 179-80 (1911). See generally RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN
AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 26-58 (1996) (discussing Sherman Act in the federal courts
from 1890 to 1911).
46. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 86 (1912); HERBERT HovENKAMP,
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 245, 266 (1991).
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the statute was not explicit on the subject, the federal courts construed it to grant
themselves exclusive jurisdiction over all suits under the act, thus prohibiting
state courts from participating in its interpretation and application.47
Third, as the economy continued to nationalize and congressional
enactments multiplied, their centralizing momentum nourished a growing belief
that national law was increasingly necessary and ever more broadly legitimate.
That belief, in turn, suggested that the federal courts might themselves properly
make national law more frequently and confidently. Indeed, the nationalization
of the economy and the expansion of federal legislation reverberated richly with
ideas about the coextensive nature of federal legislative and judicial power.
Going back to Hamilton's essays in The Federalist and the decisions of the
Marshall Court, the scope of federal judicial power had often been understood as
being co-extensive with federal legislative power.48 If the latter was expanding,
then the former might properly do so as well. On that logic, in 1901 the Court set
aside state common law and declared its authority to make and enforce a truly
national common law of interstate commerce, a body of law that was
independent of the states, supreme over state laws, and alterable only by
Congress.49
Further, one of the principal characteristics of the new congressional
activism was the establishment of federal regulatory agencies, a development that
led the federal judiciary to pay close heed to the national government's
increasingly pervasive regulatory practices. 50  The spread of agency regulation
47. Section 4 of the Sherman Act "invested" the federal courts "with jurisdiction" to "prevent
and restrain violations of this act," and section 7 provided that "[a]ny person" injured by violations
of the act "may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States." Act of July 2, 1890
(Sherman Antitrust Act), ch. 647, §§ 4, 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890). No section, however, provided
that federal jurisdiction was "exclusive" or that state courts were barred from hearing suits under
the act. The legislative history on the issue was ambiguous. The Senate, by a vote of 13-36,
defeated an amendment offered by Senator Reagan specifying that suits under the act could be
brought in either state or federal court, but Senator Edmunds, a principal opponent, argued against
the amendment on the ground that it was unnecessary because the act, as written, left litigants free
to sue in either a state or federal court. The debate was confused by conflicting views as to the
power of Congress with respect to state courts and uncertainty about the authority of state courts to
grant a treble-damages remedy. See 1-4 KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4.13 (2008).
Subsequently, the Court settled the issue, declaring that jurisdiction under both the Sherman Act
and the amending Clayton Act was exclusive in the federal courts. Blumenstock Brothers Adver.
Agency v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440 (1920); Gen. Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S.
Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 286-88 (1922).
48. FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT
AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, ch. 8 (1988).
49. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1901). Revealingly, the Court
ignored the idea of coextensive powers when, addressing a dispute between states over riparian
rights, it created substantive federal common law to decide the case and ruled that Congress had no
authority to legislate over such matters. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94-97 (1907). See
PURCELL, supra note 27, at 57-63.
50. William M. Wiecek, Justice David J. Brewer and 'The Constitution in Exile', 33 J. SUP.
CT. HIST. 170, 176 (2008). For example, the Court checked the Interstate Commerce Commission
closely in its early years, denying its power to set rates and to make "final" findings of fact before
acceding to both when Congress expressly granted those powers to the commission in the Hepburn
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forced the Court gradually to develop a distinctive body of administrative law,
applying 9eneral legal principles to allow an increasingly wide scope for agency
regulation' while still ensuring that agency actions were within the limits of
delegated authority and supported by evidence in the record.52 This widening
and ongoing involvement with the administration of national regulatory programs
focused the federal judiciary more commonly on issues of federal law and
highlighted the spread of national standards in economic and regulatory matters.
Finally, the new and more prominent role that the United States began to
play in world affairs in the late nineteenth century further reinforced the Court's
nationalizing and centralizing thrust. After 1890 it approved broader
congressional power to organize and govern territorial acquisitions 53 and
embraced the proposition that the federal government had exclusive authority
over issues of immigration and naturalization,54 thereby restricting or eliminating
powers that the states had exercised for more than a century. Similarly, the Court
began to accord ever greater authority and discretion to the executive in
conducting foreign policy, exercising congressionally delegated powers, and
concluding "executive agreements" with foreign nations. Perhaps most
striking, in dealing with those issues the Court began to invoke amorphous
principles of implied national powers. Upholding congressional authority to
exclude aliens, it relied on the "inherent and inalienable right" of the national
government to control its territory; 56 approving the executive's use of deadly
force to protect federal officials, it cited unspecified "rights, duties, and
obligations growing out of the Constitution, our international relations, and all
Act of 1906. See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co.,
167 U.S. 479, 504-05 (1897); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Ala. Midland Ry. Co., 168 U.S.
144, 161-62 (1897).
51. E.g., Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 215 U.S. 452,470 (1910).
52. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88,
92 (1913) (holding that a federal equity court may set aside an agency finding that lacks supporting
evidence in record); Phila. Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 620 (1912) (holding that a federal official
acting in excess of authority may be enjoined); Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187
U.S. 94, 108 (1902) (holding that a federal equity court may enjoin an action of the Postmaster
General unsupported by evidence). Checking such actions by injunction was not unprecedented,
though in the nineteenth century the Court had usually relied on mandamus, a narrower remedy
limited to instances where an official had a positive duty to act. See John F. Duffy, Administrative
Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REv. 113, 121-31 (1998). See generally Ann
Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action-A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L.
REv. 197 (1991) (analyzing nineteenth-century judicial review of administrative decision-making).
53. E.g., De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 196-97 (1901). See generally JAMES EDWARD KERR,
THE INSULAR CASES: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM (1982).
54. E.g., Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 543 (1895); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581, 600-01 (1889).
55. E.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892). See EDWARD G. WHITE,
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 37-42 (2000); Walter LaFeber, The Constitution and
United States Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, 74 J. AM. HIST. 695, 702-08 (1987).
56. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711.
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the protection implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution. 57
Those decisions planted the seeds for vastly expanded federal powers in
international affairs, powers that would ultimately resonate in domestic affairs as
well.58
B. Doctrines of the Transformation
The Court's decisions transforming the role and jurisdiction of the federal
courts ranged widely across the doctrinal universe and reshaped American law
from highly technical rules of procedure to fundamental principles of
constitutional law. The justices naturally drew on established precedents and
"traditional" principles, but they also remolded those precedents and principles
by infusing new meanings, identifying new implications, and giving new breadth
and vigor to their application. Together, they changed the law in six general
areas.
1. Constitutional Limits on State Legislation
First, the Court expanded the constitutional limits on legislative action,
especially limits on actions of the states. The doctrines of substantive due
process and "liberty of contract" had gestated in the state courts during the
nineteenth century, but at century's end the Supreme Court embraced them and
gave them national application, imposing uniform and judicially enforceable
limits on both state and federal power. 59 While those were highly visible and
particularly controversial doctrines, they constituted only a small part of the new
constitutional limitations the Court imposed. There were many others. Between
19 10 and 1916 the Court developed the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions,"
57. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890). See also Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 434-35
(1902) (holding that the commander-in-chief power "assumed" to allow the President, absent
legislative authorization, to permit foreign troops to enter United States in pursuit of Indians).
58. The expansion of the national government's powers over immigration and foreign affairs
and especially the use of the concept of "implied" powers were in some tension with the broad
assertion of judicial authority that characterized the transformation. For the Court's willingness to
have the federal judicial power limited in immigration and exclusion matters, see, for example,
United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 262-63 (1905) (upholding a congressional act making an
administrator's factual decision final and conclusive on the question of the alleged American
"citizenship" of a petitioner seeking entry); Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 543 (upholding a
congressional act that denied federal courts the authority to review decisions of an administrator
refusing person admission to United States). In cases involving immigration, especially Asian
immigration, and the foreign-affairs powers of the national government the operative social and
political considerations were quite different from those that animated the Court in the other areas
discussed. See, e.g., Lucy E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE
SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW ch. 4 (1995).
59. E.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180-81 (1908) (invalidating a federal statute
prohibiting railroads from requiring employees to sign "yellow dog" contracts); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (invalidating a state statute limiting bakers' work hours); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 593 (1897) (invalidating a state statute prohibiting contracts with out-of-
state insurance companies).
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limiting a variety of state efforts to regulate corporations by subjecting them to
local taxation, licensing, and other such restrictions. 60 Further, it also began to
use other constitutional provisions to limit state government. In 1897, for
example, it held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment,61 making the latter provision applicable against the
states.62
Similarly, the Court began to develop constitutional limits on the extra-
territorial reach of state laws. A burgeoning national market in a nation with a
federalized law-making structure inevitably created both practical uncertainties
and complex choice-of-law questions, and national rules seemed increasingly
necessary to mark the limits of state regulatory power and to prevent the laws of
one state from intruding into the affairs of another. Although the Court was
reluctant to constitutionalize choice-of-law rules, in the early twentieth century it
began using both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Due Process Clause to
impose boundaries on the "legislative jurisdiction" of the states. 64  In cases
involving out-of-state parties and events, it used the former to identify situations
where the Constitution required a forum state to enforce the laws of another state,
while it used the latter to identify situations where the Constitution prohibited a
forum state from enforcing its own laws.65 No state, the Court explained in 1914,
60. GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF JURISTIC PERSONS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW ch. 8 (1918). See also Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and
Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321, 335-41 (1935) (discussing Court cases between
1910 and 1922 that addressed states' treatment of foreign corporations).
61. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
62. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), extended the protections of the Fourth Amendment to
corporations and seemed to hint that some analogous restrictions on state power might be available
to corporations under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 76-77. Hale also held, however, that the
self-incrimination provision of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to corporations. The turn-of-
the-century Court refused to incorporate other provisions of the Bill of Rights. E.g., Minneapolis &
St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (Seventh Amendment right to trial by
unanimous jury); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 460 (1907) (First Amendment right to free
speech); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 261-62 (1904) (Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 595 (1900) (Sixth Amendment right to twelve-person
jury).
63. The problem of the extraterritorial application of state law helped spur the development of
substantive due process. E.g., Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 593 (holding that due process voided a state
statute barring a state's citizens from contracting with out-of-state insurance companies not
registered in state).
64. PURCELL, supra note 27, at 182-84.
65. E.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 376-77 (1918) (holding that the Due
Process Clause prohibits a state from applying its own law to a contract made in another state);
N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 162 (1914) (holding that the Due Process Clause limits
the ability of a forum state to apply its own laws); Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green,
237 U.S. 531, 542 (1915) (requiring the forum state to apply the laws of the chartering state to a
suit involving a fraternal benevolent corporation); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 241, 260 (1912)
(requiring the forum state to apply the law of another state because the issue was within "the
regulatory power" of the latter).
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may acquire the right to exert an authority beyond its borders which it cannot
exercise consistently with the Constitution ... [b]ut the Constitution and its
limitations are the safeguards of all the States preventing any and all of them
under the guise of license or otherwise from exercising powers not possessed.6 6
Further, the need to control the extraterritorial reach of state laws combined
with a growing call for uniform national rules to highlight the utility of two
powerful and centralizing doctrines, the "dormant" Commerce Clause67 and
"field" preemption.6 8 At the turn of the century the Court began to wield both to
exclude state laws from many regulatory areas. Although the Court had long
recognized the dormant Commerce Clause, in the late nineteenth century its
unpredictable and fact-based decisions had usually allowed state measures to
pass scrutiny.69 In the 1890s, however, it began to use the doctrine more widely
and, in the early twentieth century, to apply it more restrictively. "In more cases
than not" after 1910, Alexander Bickel explained, the doctrine operated "to
inhibit state regulatory power.
' 70
More striking, the Court relied increasingly on the related doctrine of
preemption and in the early twentieth century expanded it well beyond its
Supremacy Clause roots. 71 The Court began to preempt state laws not only when
they conflicted with federal law but also when federal law "occupied" a "field.,
72
In such cases, federal law displaced all state and local laws regardless of whether
they conflicted with federal law.7 3 In some cases, moreover, the Court held that
state laws were preempted even when the relevant statutes and legislative
histories offered no basis for doing SO.74 In Southern Railway v. Reid75 in 1912
the Court issued "for the first time consistently clear and explicit statements of
genuine preemption principles," adopting the sweeping rule that whenever
federal law occupied an area it necessarily terminated the "general authority of
the state to enact any laws in that area in the future--even those that are
66. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 234 U.S. at 164.
67. E.g., McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 131-32 (1913).
68. E.g., N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U.S. 370, 378-79 (1912).
69. See CURRIE, supra note 5, at 31-40.
70. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE
GOVERNMENT, 1910-1921, at 265 (1984) (referring to the period from 1910 to 1914). Some
dormant Commerce Clause cases, Bickel commented, exemplified "judicial intervention in the
handling of social problems that were themselves, at this time, the virtually unquestioned
autonomous concern of state and local government, if of any government at all." Id.
71. E.g., Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 506 (1913).
72. E.g., S. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Ind., 236 U.S. 439, 447-48 (1915).
73. E.g., Adams Express Co., 226 U.S. at 506 (preempting state laws designed to regulate
transportation company efforts to limit its liability in interstate commerce). See BICKLE &
SCHMIDT, supra note 70, at 270-75, 415-18. See also Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 770-85 (1994) (arguing that modem preemption is based not
on the Supremacy Clause but on the Necessary and Proper Clause).
74. BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 70, at 271-75.
75. 222 U.S. 424 (1912). Accord, e.g., Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Vamville
Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915).
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consistent with and supplement federal law." 76  In developing its expanded
preemption doctrine, the Court was "predominantly" and "unnecessarily hostile
to state legislation."" Indeed, it seemed particularly hostile to state workman's
compensation laws, holding them wholly preempted in areas controlled by the
Federal Employers' Liability Act or falling within the admiralty jurisdiction of
the national courts. In both areas the law should be "uniform," the Court ruled,
and that required the imposition of national law and the exclusion of state law.78
Together, the dormant Commerce Clause and the Court's new field-
preemption doctrine substantially "enhanced federal power." Their frequent use
to invalidate state laws, Stephen Gardbaum concluded, stood "in stark contrast to
the Court's practice of almost always upholding state laws during the previous
century.,79 Nationalization of the economy, the Court and many others had come
to believe, required the nationalization of law and the uniformity of economic
regulation.
s0
2. Federal Equity Jurisdiction
The Court's second major change, perhaps equally well known and certainly
as controversial, was the expansion of federal equity jurisdiction. After 1890, the
federal courts increasingly issued injunctions to block state regulatory actions 1
and began using due-process ideas to justify "rate-making" injunctions, and by
the early twentieth century they were hearing a wide variety of equitable suits
challenging state efforts to establish or regulate the rates charged by railroads and
other public utilities.82  Similarly, they also began to scrutinize state taxation
more thoroughly and more frequently, and federal injunctions against state taxes
grew in number and prominence. 83 So, too, did federal equity receiverships, with
76. Stephen A. Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64
U. CHI. L. REv. 483, 534 (1997); Gardbaum, supra note 73, at 795-805; Lawrence Lessig,
Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 125, 166.
77. BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 70, at 270.
78. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1917); S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
79. Gardbaum, supra note 73, at 801.
80. Id.; Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age.' Federalism and the
Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1067 (1988).
81. "Prior to 1890, the inferior federal courts had issued a few injunctions restraining state and
county officials from enforcing state legislative acts alleged to be unconstitutional. It was not until
after 1890, however, that these courts began the practice of enjoining state county attorneys and
state attorneys general, from initiating criminal prosecutions under alleged invalid state liquor and
railroad rate laws." Warren, supra note 5, at 373. See also Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of
Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 CAL. L. REv. 487,
532 n.140 (1965).
82. E.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154
U.S. 362 (1894). For more analysis of the Court's controversies regarding railroad and utility-rate
regulation, see generally Siegel, supra note 32, at 232-59.
83. E.g., Meyer v. Wells Fargo & Co., 223 U.S. 298, 302 (1912) (holding that a state gross-
receipts tax imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce); Dewey v. Des Moines,
173 U.S. 193, 203 (1899) (stating that state taxation must be limited to "persons and property or
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some 200 railroads seeking federal judicial protection in the 1880s and more than
350 doing so in the 1890s. 84 "[F]ederal judges presiding over reorganizations
were not at all timid about stretching their authority,"85 Robert Gordon noted, and
in the decades around the turn of the century they adopted increasingly expansive
views of federal equity power in administering corporate reorganizations.
Perhaps most politically explosive, industrial strife and new labor-union
militance gave rise to the federal labor injunction, a tool that the Supreme Court
embraced and strengthened in 1895 when it decided In re Debs.8P There, the
Court announced the vital principle that the federal courts had an inherent and
sweeping power, absent congressional authorization, to enjoin any labor action
that interfered with interstate commerce. 88 By the first decade of the twentieth
century the lower federal courts were enjoining more and more strikes, boycotts,
organizing campaigns, and other labor-union activities, and their injunctions
grew in both the sweep of their prohibitions and the frequency of their use.
89
The turn-of-the-century Court repeatedly expanded the availability of
federal equity jurisdiction. In 1908 it interpreted the Sherman Antitrust Act to
provide a basis for enjoining labor activities, 90 and it broadened the kinds of
"property" that equity would protect, including employer rights under the
upon the business done within the State"); Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U.S. 161, 166 (1890) (holding
that states cannot "lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form"); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S.
275, 281 (1876) (invalidating a local sales tax that discriminated against out-of-state goods). The
federal courts also held that they were not prohibited from issuing tax injunctions even when state
law prohibited state courts from issuing such injunctive relief. In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 188-89
(1893); Taylor v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 88 F. 350, 356 (6th Cir. 1898). Demonstrating
its greater concern with controlling the states, the Court held that the territorial limits on state
taxation imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment were inapplicable to the United States government
under the same due-process language in the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S.
299, 305-06 (1914). See also infra note 136.
84. Albro Martin, Railroads and the Equity Receivership: An Essay on Institutional Change,
34 J. ECON. HIST. 685, 705 (1974).
85. Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise,
1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 108 (Gerald L. Geison
ed., 1983).
86. See, e.g., N. Pac. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 502 (1913); Louisville Trust Co. v.
Louisville, New Albany & Chi. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674, 688-89 (1899).
87. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
88. PURCELL, supra note 27, at 60-63.
89. DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE
LIBERALISM 76-89 (1995); WILLIAM E. FORBAT, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 59-97 (1991); FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 89-
105 (1930). By 1920 American courts had issued close to a thousand such injunctions. IRVING
BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1920-1933, at 200-01
(1966).
90. E.g., Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 436-39 (1911) (allowing an
injunction for circulation of an "Unfair" list urging the boycott of a company); Lowe v. Lawlor,
208 U.S. 274, 303 (1908) (allowing an injunction under the Sherman Antitrust Act).
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notorious "yellow-dog" contract. 9' Further, it stretched the gateway concept of
"irreparable harm" while narrowing the restrictive requirement that equity
jurisdiction existed only when there was no "adequate remedy at law."92 Finally,
it extended the principle that federal equity would enjoin the enforcement of
unconstitutional laws to the broader principle that it would also enjoin efforts to
enforce concededly constitutional state laws if the means of enforcement were
unconstitutional.93
3. Federal Common Law
While the Court expanded constitutional limitations and the scope of federal
equity jurisdiction, it also expanded the reach of substantive "general" federal
common law. In 1842 its decision in Swift v. Tyson 94 authorized the federal
courts to make their own "independent" judgments on general common-law
issues free from the rules enforced by state courts,95 and over the following half-
century their decisions gradually and substantially expanded the general law's
realm. While Swift had addressed issues of commercial law, by the late
nineteenth century the federal courts had stretched the "general" law to include
most common-law fields, including wills, contracts, torts, deeds, mortgages, rules
of evidence, and measures of damages. Indeed, in 1888 the Court acknowledged
that the problem of identifying the scope of general law had become "an
embarrassing one.",96 In 1893 it further extended the reach of general law to
cover essentially the entire field of industrial torts;97 in 1910 it began treating
important elements of local property law as questions of general federal law;
98
and in 1917 it used the idea of general law both to expand federal judicial power
and to limit state legislative authority in admiralty matters. 99
91. The Court invalidated both state and federal statutes outlawing "yellow-dog" contracts.
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1915) (state); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 179-80
(1908) (federal).
92. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (recognizing "good will" of
employees as "property" protectable by injunction); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518 (1898)
(suggesting the possibility that a rate regulation could give rise to multiple suits was sufficient to
deny an "adequate remedy at law); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 395
(1894) (suggesting that an "adequate remedy at law" sufficient to oust federal equity had to be a
remedy available in the federal courts). See also Dianne Avery, Images of Violence in Labor
Jurisprudence: The Regulation of Picketing and Boycotts, 1894-1921, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 70-76
(1989).
93. Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 499, 507 (1917) (stating that the
"principle" of Young is "not confined to the maintenance of suits for restraining the enforcement of
statutes which as enacted by the state legislature are in themselves unconstitutional").
94. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
95. Id at 18-19. See also TONY FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE
CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 1- 11, 14-17 (1981).
96. Bucher v. Cheshire R.R. Co., 125 U.S. 555, 583 (1888).
97. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 370-71 (1893).
98. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 359 (1910).
99. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917).
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More fundamentally, the Court extended the concept of general law to
include legal principles it considered "fundamental" to reasonable constitutional
order and thereby gradually created a form of "general" constitutional law.
Exercising their "independent" judgment of state law in cases brought under
diversity jurisdiction, federal courts began using principles of general
constitutional law to protect out-of-state creditors, bondholders, and corporations
from state actions they considered abusive or unfair. In doing so, they "applied
their own presumption about the scope of state and local government powers,"
Professors Ann Woolhander and Michael G. Collins explained, and they
interpreted "state constitutional provisions based on what they referred to as
principles of 'general constitutional law."' 00 By the late nineteenth century the
federal courts were using general constitutional law as a basis for deciding cases
involving such fundamental issues as "takings of property, taxing and spending
for public purposes, rate making and delegation doctrines, and the permissible
limits of governmental power."' Together, their decisions "provided a ready
source of substantive limits on governmental action" and freed the federal courts
from state-court rules of constitutional and common law.' 
02
Indeed, the Court's conception of general common law underwrote what
may have been its boldest assertion of federal judicial power. In 1907,
considering a dispute over riparian rights between two states, it invoked its 1901
decision establishing a federal common law of interstate commerce'0 3 to rule that
neither the states nor any other branch of the federal government could make law
to control such interstate disputes. Only the Court itself, the justices declared in
Kansas v. Colorado, held such power, a power unchecked by any other level or
branch of government.' 
04
100. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the Administrative State,
87 CAL. L. REV. 613, 623 (1999) [hereinafter Woolhandler & Collins, Judicial Federalism]. In a
wide-ranging series of superb and incisive articles, Professors Woolhandler and Collins have
explored the complex doctrinal processes by which the idea of "general" law gave rise to a
"general" constitutional law which the Court, in turn, transformed into truly "federal" constitutional
law, that is, law based on the Constitution. Most directly on point are Michael G. Collins, Before
Lochner-Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law," 74 TULANE
L. REV. 1263 (2000) [hereinafter Collins, Before Lochner]; Michael G. Collins, October Term,
1896-Embracing Due Process, AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 71 (2001) [hereinafter Collins, October Term];
Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE
L.J. 77 (1997) [hereinafter Woolhandler, Common Law Origins]; Woolhandler, supra note 11; and
Woolhandler, supra note 52. Other illuminating articles in the series include the following: Ann
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387 (1995) [hereinafter
Woolhandler & Collins, State Standing]; Michael G. Collins, Article 111 Cases, State Court Duties,
and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wisc. L. REV. 39; Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas,
45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993); and Michael G. Collins, 'Economic Rights,' Implied Constitutional
Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1493 (1989) [hereinafter Collins,
Economic Rights].
101. Collins, Before Lochner, supra note 100, at 1265.
102. Id. at 1267.
103. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901).
104. 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907). See also PURCELL, supra note 27, at 57-60.
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4. Sources of Federal Law and Jurisdiction
More broadly, the Court reconceived both the sources of federal law and the
role and jurisdiction of the federal courts. As for the sources of federal law, its
cautious but growing reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment merged with the
amorphous and elastic idea of "general" law, especially "general" constitutional
law, to underwrite a broadened understanding of constitutional limits and, more
important, a growing sense that the Constitution required the courts to enforce
those limits against government more tightly and commonly.'0 5  The Court
transmuted "general" constitutional law into the law of the Constitution itself,
expanded the scope of the Constitution's provisions, and came to understand the
Constitution-in particular, the Fourteenth Amendment-as authorizing the
courts to recognize causes of action and provide appropriate remedies for its
violation. During the 1890s "formerly nonfederal constitutional principles
associated with takings, public-purpose limits, rate reasonableness questions and
others, "were expressly rechristened as federal limits on state governments."'
0 6
Indeed, Professor Collins has identified the Court's 1896-97 Term as
"Federalization's Moment," the exact time when the justices-addressing issues
of takings, contractual freedom, the requirement of just compensation, the
reasonableness of rate regulation, and "public purpose" limits on state taxation-
began transmuting issues of "general" law into explicitly federal constitutional
issues.0 7  Revealingly, too, the Term witnessed a striking moment of judicial
candor from the justice who would subsequently author both Young and Lochner.
Writing for the Court in Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley in 1896, Justice
Peckham explained that he relied explicitly on the Fourteenth Amendment rather
than on "general" law because he was no longer willing to invoke "the pretext"
of general constitutional law.' 8 Peckham made the significance of the shift from
general to truly federal constitutional law crystal clear: the federal courts would
henceforth "be justified" in reaching their decisions on constitutional-law issues
105. See Collins, Before Lochner, supra note 100, at 1305-11.
106. Id. at 1311. Accord Woolhandler, supra note 11, at 398-99. What had happened gradually
became clear to some commentators. In the late nineteenth century the Court's "majority were
content to rest the doctrine of no taxation for a private purpose on the essential nature of
government." By the early twentieth century, however, the "philosophical and political error of
their ways has been abandoned by their successors," and the Court's limiting "doctrines are now
applied as interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment." Thomas Reed Powell, Taxation of
Things in Transit, 1, 7 VA. L. REV. 167, 176-77 (1920).
107. See Collins, Before Lochner, supra note 100, at 1305-11; Collins, October Term, supra
note 100, at 92-96. Professor Collins suggested a variety of social and legal reasons why the 1896
Term proved pivotal, including the fact that the "sweeping re-election of the Republicans" in the
1896 election ended the "immediate threat to the Court" from Populist and Democratic attacks.
Collins, October Term, 1896, supra note 100, at 92-96 (quote at 96).
108. Fallbrook, 164 U.S. 112, 155 (1896). Professor Collins and Professor Siegel have both
pointed to the significance of this relatively unknown case. See Collins, October Term, supra note
100, at 76; Siegel, supra note 32, at 216 n.130. Three years before Peckham's admission, Justice
Stephen J. Field made a similar acknowledgment of the Court's calculated use of general federal
common law as a tool to enable it to ignore state law and "control" an issue with a different rule.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 397-99, 401 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
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regardless of "clear and repeated decisions of the highest court of the state to the
contrary."' 10 9
As the Court reconceived the sources of federal law, it simultaneously
reconceived the role and jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Indeed, if the
1896 Term marked the Court's first decisions transforming "general"
constitutional law into the law of the Constitution itself, the two pathbreaking
state ratemaking cases decided during the 1890s-Reagan v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co.l l0 and Smyth v. Ames''-bracketed the Term and confirmed that
sometime between 1894 and 1898 the Court's understanding of the law and
jurisdiction of the federal courts had changed drastically.
Deciding Reagan in 1894, the Court had been unable to specify whether it
was state, federal, or "general" law that made the state's rates "unreasonable,"
and it failed to identify the suit's jurisdictional basis as resting on a federal
question. 112  Instead, it relied on the presence of diversity jurisdiction and
stressed repeatedly that the plaintiff was entitled to the protection of a federal
court because he was "a citizen of another state."' 13 Four years later, however,
addressing the identical ratemaking issue in Smyth v. Ames, the Court understood
both the law and jurisdiction quite differently. Then, it voided the state's rates as
unreasonable on explicitly federal grounds-the Fourteenth Amendment-and
expressly affirmed that the lower court had jurisdiction over the suit because
plaintiffs claim presented a federal question. 14 Thus, by 1898 the Court had
come to understand that the law limiting state ratemaking was not general law
but the law of the United States Constitution itself. Further, it had also come to
understand that diversity jurisdiction was unnecessary in such a case because the
claim fell within the trial court's general federal-question jurisdiction and,
consequently, that the plaintiff was entitled to the protection of a federal court not
because he was a citizen from another state but because he relied on a federal
right. The Court had come to understand, in other words, that citizenship and
diversity jurisdiction were irrelevant when plaintiffs raised claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment and that the role of the lower courts was to protect
federal rights whether they belonged to citizens or non-citizens of a forum
state. 115
That reconceptualization not only expanded the reach of federal law but also
expanded the jurisdiction and power of the entire federal judiciary. In theory,
general law was "state" law, not truly "federal" law. Hence, state courts were not
bound by the general-law rules of the federal courts, and state legislatures could
alter or abolish them and, at least sometimes, make their new statutory provisions
109. Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 155.
110. 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
111. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
112. See Reagan, 154 U.S. at 390-91, 412.
113. Id. at 391. See also id. at 395, 399.
114. See Smyth, 169 U.S. at 518, 522-27.
115. See Purcell, supra note 14, at 2045-49; Woolhandler, Common Law Origins, supra note
100, at 129-32.
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binding on the federal courts." 16 Further, claims based on general law did not
give rise to federal-question jurisdiction in the lower courts, and they did not
come within the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state-court cases." 7
Reconceptualizing general constitutional law as truly "federal law," then,
abolished all those limitations on federal judicial power. It made the rulings of
the federal courts on those federalized issues binding on state courts under the
Supremacy Clause, and it deprived state legislatures of the power to overturn
them by statute and impose their state-law rules on the federal courts. Further, it
made cases raising such federalized issues initially cognizable in the national
courts under their general federal-question jurisdiction, and it made the decisions
of state courts addressing such issues reviewable on appeal in the United States
Supreme Court.'1 8  The reconceptualization thus radically changed the
relationship between the federal judiciary and the states, both their courts and
their legislatures.
The reconceptualization quickly inspired a cascade of compatible and
reinforcing doctrinal shifts." 9 One was the Court's decision to cut back on the
scope of federal diversity jurisdiction.' 20  Believing that future federal-law
challenges to regulatory efforts would likely bring "a great flood of litigation" to
the national courts,' 2 and recognizing that those suits would henceforth usually
be brought under federal-question jurisdiction, the Court sought to offset
anticipated docket growth by systematically and selectively narrowing the scope
of diversity jurisdiction. 22  In a series of decisions between 1900 and 1906 it
adjusted a variety of jurisdictional rules to accomplish that result, in effect
116. The Swift doctrine freed federal courts from following state-court rulings on common-law
issues but not from following applicable state statutes that codified those issues. See ARMISTEAD
M. DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 563-64 (1928) (explaining the
general rule and identifying situations where federal courts could avoid the force of state statutes
that altered common-law rules).
117. Id. at 163-74, 872-900.
118. The reconceptualization of the federal judicial power and the transition from "general" to
truly "federal" law reflected, if it was not encouraged, by the rise of legal positivism in the late
nineteenth century. Focusing attention on the sovereign authority that lay behind law, positivism
made "general" law seem anomalous and even incoherent. As the Court was enforcing a de facto
national law in many of its decisions, it seemed logical to find the source of that law in the
Constitution.
119. The results included the expansion of both the pendent and ancillary jurisdictions of the
lower federal courts, Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 173, 191 (1909) (pendent);
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 499, 508, 512-14 (1917) (pendent); Root v.
Woolworth, 150 U.S. 401, 410-13 (1893) (ancillary), and the explicit assertion of a broad power in
the federal courts to imply private causes of action from federal statutes. Tex. & Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 38-40 (1916). See generally Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and
Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REv. 67, 71-83 (2001) (discussing the demise of
the traditional standards for rights and remedies).
120. Previously, the federal courts had used diversity jurisdiction broadly to enforce "general"
law and, in many cases, to protect essentially federal rights and interests. See, e.g., Collins, Before
Lochner, supra note 100, at 1267, 1283, 1302-03; Woolhandler, Common Law Origins, supra note
100, at 89-92, 156-57.
121. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 166 (1908).
122. PURCELL, supra note 11, at 272-81.
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barring large numbers of ordinary and relatively unimportant private tort and
contract actions from the national courts.' 23
Another consequence was that the Court steadily narrowed Eleventh
Amendment restrictions imposed on the national courts. Although it had
expanded the Amendment's reach as part of the post-Reconstruction settlement,
after 1890 it began to contract its scope severely and steadily. 2 4 By the early
years of the twentieth century, it had established that the Eleventh Amendment
would not bar the federal courts from enjoining state officials who attempted to
enforce unconstitutional laws. 125 By the same time, it had also ruled that the
Amendment did not prevent the federal courts from hearing suits against cities,
counties, and other local government units, that it did not bar federal suits against
states brought by the United States government, and that it did not prohibit the
Court itself from hearing appeals from state courts in cases where states were
parties and federal-law issues were involved. 
26
A third consequence of the transformation was the steady expansion of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the continued elevation of its role. While in 1880
the Court had expressed doubts about the Amendment's judicial enforceability
absent authorizing legislation, 27 a decade later it announced that the Amendment
gave the federal courts inherent authority to review state economic regulation to
ensure its reasonableness. 2 8 In Reagan and Smyth, the Court not only confirmed
123. Id. It was revealing that in cutting back on diversity jurisdiction the Court took care to
maintain the jurisdiction in cases involving such economically important actions as shareholder
derivative suits, Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579, 587 (1905), state condemnation proceedings,
Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 255 (1905), federal
receiverships in corporate reorganizations, In re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U.S. 90, 109
(1908), and challenges to state regulatory efforts when the relevant state agency was alleged to be a
"citizen" of the regulating state, R.R. Comm'n of La. v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 212 U.S. 414,
418 (1909). Both shareholder derivative suits and equity receiverships grew rapidly in the federal
courts between 1880 and 1900, and their national economic significance was apparent. See
HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 44-45, 60-62 (derivative suits); Warren, supra note 5, at 364-66
(receiverships).
124. See JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 121-52 (1987); Purcell,
supra note 14, at 1962-75.
125. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518-19 (1898); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154
U.S. 362, 389 (1894). Such other cases include, for example, Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Railroad
Co., 200 U.S. 273, 283 (1906); Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1903); Tindal v. Wesley, 167
U.S. 204, 220 (1897); and Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 69-70 (1897). See Woolhandler, supra
note 11, at 446-49.
126. Workman v. New York, 179 U.S. 552, 565 (1900) (holding that municipalities are not
protected by Eleventh Amendment); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 449 (1900) (stating that the
Supreme Court has authority to review state-court decisions in which states are parties and federal-
law issues are involved); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644 (1892) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar a federal court from hearing suits against a state brought by the
United States); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890) (holding that counties are
not protected by the Eleventh Amendment). Cities and other local government agencies were
regarded, in some other contexts, as sharing in a state's sovereign immunity. 5 FOWLER V. HARPER
ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.6, at 624 (2d ed. 1986).
127. Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880).
128. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890).
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that new principle but enforced it with injunctions against state rates that the
justices found unreasonable. 129
Since its adoption, the Fourteenth Amendment had been in inherent tension
with the Eleventh, the former-assuming its judicial enforceability absent
authorizing legislation-expanding federal judicial power and the latter
constraining it. The Court's reconceptualization and reorientation of the federal
judiciary resolved most of that tension heavily in favor of federal judicial power.
The change was starkly illustrated by the contrasting language of In re Ayers,1
30
decided in 1887 at the height of the Court's acquiescence in the post-
Reconstruction settlement, and Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los
Angeles,' 3' decided in 1913 when the transformation was largely complete. "To
secure the manifest purposes of the constitutional exemption guaranteed by the
l1th Amendment," Ayers had proclaimed approvingly and enthusiastically,
"requires that it should be interpreted not literally and too narrowly, but fairly,
and with such breadth and largeness as effectually to accomplish the substance of
its purpose.' 32 The Court's language literally beamed on the Amendment.
By 1913, however, such prideful and solicitous language no longer fit the
Eleventh Amendment but instead crowned its rival, the Fourteenth. Then, a
unanimous Court in Home Telephone quickly and easily dismissed the relevance
of the Eleventh Amendment and declared, in effect, that the Fourteenth
Amendment reigned triumphant.' 33 The latter Amendment was addressed "to
every person, whether natural or juridical, who is the repository of state power,"
and it reached "any exercise by a State of power, in whatever form exerted.'
' 34
Whether the action of a state official was lawful or unlawful under state law
made no difference, for any action taken by any person acting under state
authority necessarily came within the "comprehensive inclusiveness" of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 35 Home Telephone announced the transformation in its
fullest form, giving the Fourteenth Amendment a sweeping scope and declaring
that the Constitution itself imposed a special role and duty on the national
judiciary: the "Federal courts are charged under the Constitution" with the duty
of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, and they-not the state courts-are
"the primary source for applying and enforcing the Constitution of the United
States in all cases covered by the Fourteenth Amendment."' 36 In no way would
129. Smyth, 169 U.S. at 550; Reagan, 154 U.S. at 412-13.
130. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
131. 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
132. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505-06.
133. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1913).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 287-88.
136. Id. at 284, 285. Illustrating the Court's special concern with limiting state, as opposed to
federal, power, Home Telephone failed even to mention "the unanimous and apparently
contradictory fifth amendment holding in Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 336 (1910) (Harlan,
J.), that the unauthorized taking of private property by a federal officer 'is not the act of the
Government."' CURRIE, supra note 5, at 109 n.123. Home Telephone, in other words, held that
unlawful actions by state officials could constitute "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment,
even though only three years earlier Hooe had held that unlawful actions by federal officials could
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the turn-of-the-century Court allow the Eleventh Amendment to interfere with
that sweeping "constitutional" duty.
Further strengthening the bases of national authority, the reconceptualization
not only expanded the federal judiciary's power but expanded the powers of
Congress as well. To the extent that the Court broadened rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, it necessarily expanded congressional powers under
Section 5 of the Amendment, which specifically gave Congress authority to
enforce the rights it created. 37  Further, by federalizing the old general
constitutional law and thereby broadening the scope of federal judicial power, the
Court suggested, via the traditional concept of co-extensive powers, that the
powers of Congress might also extend more broadly. Indeed, the Court followed
that reasoning when it used the Constitution's grant of admiralty jurisdiction to
the federal courts to imply a coextensive power in Congress to legislate over
matters of maritime law. 38 More forcefully, in 1917 it implicitly stretched that
theory to deny state legislative power altogether over all admiralty and maritime
issues, thereby making congressional power in those areas exclusive.' 
39
5. Curbing State Legislative Restrictions on Federal Jurisdiction
While the first four elements of the transformation cabined state power and
expanded both federal lawmaking authority and the supervisory role of the
national courts, its last two elements were defensive corollaries designed to
safeguard those changes and ensure their efficacy. To serve the transformation's
purposes, the Court had to protect the federal courts from state efforts to interfere
with their jurisdiction and to avoid the force of their judgments. Thus, it had to
check state legislative efforts to narrow or defeat federal jurisdiction, and it had
to strengthen its own ability to supervise the state courts to ensure that, when
they did hear issues of federal law, they resolved them properly and fully
honored the mandate of the Supremacy Clause.
not constitute "state action" under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Home Tel. &
Tel. Co., 227 U.S. at 288. Similarly, in 1914 the Court held that the due process limits on federal
taxation under the Fifth Amendment were much less restrictive than the due process limits on state
taxation imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, 304-07
(1914).
137. Professor Morton Horwitz suggested that nineteenth-century ideas of federalism and a
general commitment to decentralization induced a majority of the Court in the 1870s to refuse to
incorporate "general" law principles into the Fourteenth Amendment. MORTON J. HORWITz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOxY 24-25
(1992). The justices may well have recognized that such an incorporation would substantially
expand both federal legislative and judicial power.
138. Butler v. Boston & Salem S. Co., 130 U.S. 527, 557 (1889) ("As the Constitution extends
the judicial power of the United States to 'all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,' and as
this jurisdiction is held to be exclusive, the power of legislation on the same subject must
necessarily be in the national legislature and not in the state legislatures."). Accord In re Gamett,
141 U.S. 1, 12 (1891). See Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause
in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1230-37 (1954).
139. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,215 (1917).
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The fifth component of the transformation, then, was the Court's effort to
prevent state legislatures from constraining the jurisdiction of the national
courts. 40 While it was long recognized that states generally could not restrict
federal jurisdiction,14 1 states nonetheless continued to adopt statutes designed to
limit that jurisdiction indirectly. Some established new actions designed to
provide an "adequate remedy at law" and, by limiting those actions to their own
courts, to defeat federal equity jurisdiction. The Court commonly refused to
allow such remedies to defeat federal equity and gradually established the firm
principle that an adequate remedy at law sufficient to defeat federal equity
jurisdiction had to be a remedy available in the federal courts. 14 2 To the same
point, the Court held in 1893 that the federal courts were not barred from issuing
tax injunctions even when state laws prohibited the local state courts from doing
143so.
States also tried persistently to prevent foreign corporations from removing
state-court actions to federal court. States had the power to exclude foreign
corporations from intrastate commerce, 44 and approximately half of them used
that power to underwrite statutes that penalized such corporations with expulsion
if they invoked federal removal jurisdiction. 45  For half a century the Court
struggled with those statutes, seeming to hold that states could not prevent
foreign corporations from actually removing but that they could nonetheless
140. The Court seemed to harbor a deep wariness about the work of state legislatures, and in
Young counsel for the railroads played on that fear. "It has become the aim of some legislatures to
frame their enactments with such cunning adroitness, and to hedge them about with such savage
and drastic penalties, as to make it impossible to test the validity of such statutes in the courts save
at a risk no prudent man would dare to assume." Young, 209 U.S. at 141 (argument for respondent,
citing Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 99-102 (1902) (discussing the Court's
prior ratemaking cases)).
141. See, e.g., Ry. Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80 U.S. 270, 280 (1871) (denying state power to
limit statutory wrongful-death suit to its own courts); Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. 118, 122
(1868) (denying state power to limit suits against counties to state courts in the county sued). See
generally Woolhandler & Collins, Judicial Federalism, supra note 100 (discussing the history of
federal-court review of state administrative actions).
142. PURCELL, supra note 27, at 323 n.34; Note, Effect of the Existence of an Adequate Remedy
at Law in the State Courts on Federal Equity Jurisdiction, 49 HARV. L. REV. 950, 953 (1936).
143. In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 188-89 (1893).
Manifestly the object of this [state] legislation was to confine the remedy of the taxpayer for
illegal assessment and taxation, to the payment of taxes under protest, and bringing suit
against the county treasurer for recovery back, but all this is nothing to the purpose. The
legislature of a State cannot determine the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, and
the action of such courts in according a remedy denied to the courts of a State does not
involve a question of power.
Id. at 189. See also Taylor v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 88 F. 350, 366 (6th Cir. 1898)
(modifying a tax injunction to allow railroad owners to pay a lower assessment on local taxes).
144. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869). The Court also ruled that corporations were not
"citizens" within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and, hence, foreign
corporations had no "right" to enter a state to conduct intrastate business. Id.
145. See PURCELL, supra note 11, at 202.
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expel them from the state's intrastate commerce if they did.146 In a series of
decisions beginning in 1910, however, the Court announced a new doctrine of
"unconstitutional conditions" designed to restrict state powers over foreign
corporations in a variety of areas, including their use of anti-removal statutes.
States could not coerce foreign corporations to surrender their federal rights, it
ruled, and they could not punish foreign corporations by excluding them from
intrastate commerce if the corporations invoked federal removal jurisdiction. 41
By 1914 the Court's decisions had, in effect, invalidated most state anti-removal
statutes, 149 leaving only an "extremely narrow" exception applicable solely to
insurance companies, 5°an exception that the Court abolished eight years later.'
5
'
A third method of defeating federal jurisdiction was to integrate state courts
in state administrative proceedings, thereby preempting a party's opportunity to
challenge a state administrative ruling in federal court. In 1908 the Court
terminated that possibility by ruling that, however much a state's administrative
procedure might involve its courts, the procedure remained "administrative" and
not "judicial." Hence, whenever a state's administrative process concluded,
regardless of the extent to which its courts had been involved, parties could
challenge the final result in a federal court free from any res judicata effect that
might otherwise attach to the judgment of a state court. 52 Indeed, on occasion
146. See HENDERSON, supra note 60, at 101-1 1; 132-47. See Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94
U.S. 535, 535 (1876) (upholding state anti-removal statute), Sec. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202
U.S. 246, 246 (1906) (upholding state anti-removal statute).
147. See HENDERSON, supra note 60, at 132.
148. See, e.g., Ludwig v. W. Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. 146, 146 (1910) (holding that applying an
anti-removal statute to a company doing interstate business was an unconstitutional interference
with the company's rights under the Commerce Clause); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1,
45-47 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56, 56 (1910); Int'l Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217
U.S. 91, 107 (1910); Herndon v. Chi. Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 135, 158-59 (1910).
149. Harrison v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R. Co., 232 U.S. 318, 332-33 (1914).
150. Paul, 75 U.S. at 183 (ruling that the business of insurance did not constitute "commerce"
and hence insurance companies were not protected by the Commerce Clause); Hooper v. Cal., 155
U.S. 648, 653 (1895).
151. The Court extinguished the narrow exception by overruling Doyle and Prewitt in Terral v.
Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529, 529 (1922). The decision prevented states from punishing
insurance companies that resorted to removal jurisdiction, and the companies immediately began
using removal regularly and frequently. PURCELL, supra note 11, at 205.
152. Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 230 (1908). Two years earlier the Court
rejected a similar state effort to avoid federal jurisdiction by making a commission order
enforceable only in a state court. That statutory enforcement procedure, the Court ruled in
Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 203 U.S. 335, 341 (1906), could
not deprive the federal courts of their jurisdiction to review the matter. Prentis can be seen as
imposing an exhaustion of remedies requirement, and the Court on occasion applied it to that
effect. E.g., Vandalia R.R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 242 U.S. 255, 260 (1916). Its primary
significance, however, was its ultimate guarantee of a federal forum once state administrative
proceedings, however structured, were completed. See Bacon v. Rutland R.R. Co., 232 U.S. 134,
134-35 (1914). If regulated parties chose to challenge administrative orders in the state courts after
the "administrative" process was completed, they forfeited their right under Prentis. See Detroit &
Mackinac Ry. Co. v. Mich. R.R. Comm'n, 235 U.S. 402, 402-03 (1914). For the operation of the
Prentis rule from the state viewpoint, see Oliver P. Field, Memorandum on Some Recent Decisions
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the Court asserted the principle so vigorously that it seemed almost to claim that
the Constitution itself established the jurisdiction of the federal courts and that
access to the federal courts was a constitutional right.
53
6. Federal Control of State Courts
The last component of the transformation comprised the Court's efforts to
assert greater control over the state courts. On one level, the Court broadened the
scope of the federal law that it required the state courts to follow. In 1903 it held
that federal law, not state law, determined the resjudicata effects of federal court
decisions on federal-law issues, insisting that constitutional rights adjudicated in
the federal courts "can never be taken away or impaired by state decisions."''
54
Similarly, in 1912 it insisted on the obligation of state courts to honor and
enforce federal law, notwithstanding any legal or policy disagreements they
might harbor. "The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with
the policy of the state and therefore that the courts of the state are free to decline
jurisdiction," it declared, "is quite inadmissible." Congressional legislation
controlled "all the people and all the states, and thereby established a policy for
all" which the state courts were obligated to enforce. 155 Two years later the
Court extended the reach of federal law further, holding that it controlled all
issues in suits brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, including any
related common-law issues that might arise. 1 6
Even more boldly, in 1908 the Court declared in General Oil Co. v. Crain
that-in the event the Eleventh Amendment barred an action in federal court-
state courts were required to provide a remedy for a state official's violation of
Relative to the Restraint and Recovery of Illegal Taxes in Iowa, 16 IOWA L. REV. 381, 386-90
(1931).
153. Harrison, 232 U.S. at 328 ("The judicial power of the United States as created by the
Constitution and provided for by Congress pursuant to its constitutional authority, is a power
wholly independent of state action and which therefore the several States may not by any exertion
of authority in any form, directly or indirectly, destroy, abridge, limit or render inefficacious.");
Herndon, 218 U.S. at 159 (stating that the "right to resort to the Federal courts is a creation of the
Constitution of the United States and the statutes passed in pursuance thereof"). Not surprisingly,
one of the most extreme statements came from Justice David J. Brewer: "[T]he jurisdiction of
Federal courts primarily rests on the Constitution of the United States, and the extent of their
jurisdiction is determined by its provisions." Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 491 (1903) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting). As a result of such statements, some business interests maintained that Congress could
not constitutionally limit diversity or removal jurisdiction, and they maintained that argument into
the 1930s-using it to help defeat congressional efforts to restrict both-in spite of the fact that in
1922 the Court explicitly ruled that it was Congress, not the Constitution, that conferred jurisdiction
on the federal courts. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922). See also PURCELL, supra
note 11, at 242.
154. Deposit Bank v. Frankfurt, 191 U.S. 499, 517 (1903). Accord Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line
R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 290-91 (1906).
155. Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912).
156. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 502 (1914). Accord S. Ry. Co. v.
Gray, 241 U.S. 333, 338 (1916).
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the U.S. Constitution. 157 Backing its declaration forcefully, it added that it would
review and reverse any state-court decision that failed to provide a remedy in
such a case.158 With a revealing bluntness that echoed through many of its turn-
of-the-century decisions, the Court justified its decision in Crain by explicitly
acknowledging the possibility that state courts might purposely try to defeat
federal law by preventing parties from obtaining judicial review of state
regulatory actions. !59 "And it will not do to say that the argument is drawn from
extremes," it proclaimed with fervor. "Constitutional provisions are based on the
possibility of extremes."' 160
On a second level, the Court remolded its own appellate jurisdiction to
broaden its reach over state-court judgments involving issues of federal law. In
1900 it affirmed without citation the principle that neither the Eleventh
Amendment nor a state's consent to be sued only in its own courts could prevent
the Court from reviewing any state-court judgment that denied "any right, title,
privilege or immunity" secured by "the Constitution or laws of the United
States."' 161 Moreover, it gradually broadened the category of state-court
judgments it would review as "final," expanding the scope of the "record" it
would consider in determining finality' 62 and accepting jurisdiction even when
further proceedings or collateral actions were continuing. 63 Similarly, the Court
began to impose clearer due-process limits on the ability of state courts to deny
federal claims on state procedural grounds' 64 and seemed to tighten the standards
it would apply in evaluating the "adequacy" of state-court judgments that
foreclosed consideration of federal rights.' 65 The bottom line, it insisted, was that
no state-law ground could be "adequate" if it was "set up as an evasion" or used
157. 209 U.S. 211,226 (1908).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 228.
160. Id. at 226-27. Crain, the Court later explained, underwrote the principle that "a State
cannot escape its constitutional obligations by the simple device of denying jurisdiction in such
cases to courts otherwise competent." Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411,415 (1920).
161. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445 (1900).
162. 16B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4009, at 151-55 (2d ed. 1996). Although the Court began the process
earlier, it was not until the 1920s and 1930s that it regularly included the opinion below and even
other material from the record as a whole in its review. E.g., Clark v. Willard, 292 U.S. 112, 118
(1934).
163. See Detroit & Mackinac Ry. Co. v. Mich. R.R. Comm'n, 240 U.S. 564 (1916); Carondelet
Canal & Navigation Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U.S. 362, 372 (1914).
164. See Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918); Saunders v. Shaw,
244 U.S. 317, 320 (1917).
165. The Court first announced the "adequacy" doctrine in Chapman v. Goodnow's
Administrator, 123 U.S. 540 (1887). Alfred Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REv.
943, 954-55 & n.43 (1965). The Court seemed to tighten the "adequacy" requirement in the early
twentieth century, e.g., Enter. Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917);
Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 231 (1904), and then to tighten it even further in the early 1920s.
Davis v. Weschler, 263 U.S. 22, 24-25 (1923); Ward v. Board of Comm'rs of Love County, 253
U.S. 17, 22-23 (1920). See also Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review
of State-Court State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REv. 80, 119-40 (2002).
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"merely to give color" to a denial of federal rights. 166  An "untenable
construction" of state law could not be allowed to defeat a federal right, the Court
declared in 1904. "To hold otherwise would open an easy method of avoiding
the jurisdiction of this court."'' 6 7
Perhaps most unprecedented, the Court announced in 1912 that its
jurisdiction to review state-court judgments included the power to examine not
just the law but the facts as well. It transformed what had previously been an
"inflexible rule" that the Court would not reexamine a state court's findings of
fact 168 into a rebuttable presumption with two highly serviceable exceptions. In a
series of four cases it advanced, implemented, and then codified "two
propositions" that were, it claimed in the last of the four, "well settled."' 169 If a
state court denied a federal right, the Court could reexamine the facts either when
a party claimed that "there was no evidence whatever to support" the denial or
when a state court's findings were "so intermingled" with its conclusions of law
that it was "essentially necessary" to reexamine the former in order to review the
latter. 170 The decisions provided a substantial new tool for the cause of judicial
centralization and federal judicial supremacy.171
The Court's tightening control over the state courts was, finally, most
broadly expanded by its transformation of the sources of federal law from
166. Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 231 (1904). Accord Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of Missouri, 248 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1918). The principle was not, of course, entirely new.
E.g., Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 855-56 (1824). What was new was the
development of an explicitly limiting doctrine that would be applied as a matter of course and the
Court's overt suggestions about the unreliability of state courts and the need for especially keen-
eyed federal judicial supervision.
167. Terre Haute & Indianapolis R.R. Co. v. Indiana, 194 U.S. 579, 589 (1904). The Court
repeatedly emphasized that its jurisdiction required it to scrutinize state-court judgments to ensure
that there was no evasion of federal law or federal rights. E.g., Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U.S. 93, 99
(1907); Vandalia R.R. Co. v. Indiana, 207 U.S. 359, 367 (1907).
168. RICHARD F. WOLSON & PHILIP B. KURLAND, ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM: JURISDICTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 198 (Richard F. Wolfson & Philip B. Kurland eds., rev. ed.
1951).
169. Creswill, 225 U.S. at 261. The three earlier cases in the sequence were Kansas City
Southern Railway Co. v. C.H. Albers Commission Co., 223 U.S. 573 (1912); Cedar Rapids Gas
Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. 655 (1912); and Washington v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510
(1912). The Court used the doctrine readily in regulatory cases. E.g., N.Y. & Queens Gas Co. v.
McCall, 245 U.S. 345, 348-49 (1917); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. West Virginia, 236 U.S. 605, 609-
10(1915).
170. Creswill, 225 U.S. at 261. The Court repeatedly reaffirmed the new power it claimed, even
when reviewing state-court judgments that were entered on jury verdicts. See WOLSON &
KURLAND, supra note 168, at 199, 202-05.
171. Although the Court employed a vigorous rhetoric, it reversed state-court decisions resting
on state-law grounds relatively rarely. See, e.g., Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200
U.S. 561, 595 (1906); Erie R.R. Co. v. Purdy, 185 U.S. 148, 154 (1902). Its reversals did not, of
course, invariably favor corporate interests. See, e.g., Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburg
Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1907). On occasion they remedied instances of particularly egregious
racial abuse. See, e.g., Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 231 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S.
442, 447-48 (1900).
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"general" constitutional principles to the Constitution. 172  Its appellate
jurisdiction did not allow it to review non-federal issues, and as long as state-
court decisions rested only on principles of "general" law-that is, "common
law" issues that were controlled by "state" law-the Court had no jurisdiction to
review them.1 73 By transmuting "general" constitutional law into the law of the
Constitution, the Court transformed issues of "general" law into authentically
"federal" issues and hence brought them within its appellate jurisdiction. Thus,
by reconceiving the sources of federal law, the Court in effect expanded its
appellate jurisdiction and enabled it to review directly state-court decisions that
involved any such issue. 1
74
Thus, between approximately 1890 and 1917 the Court fundamentally
reshaped the role and jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. It substantially
widened the realm of national law that the federal courts controlled, expanded
their equity and federal-question jurisdiction, strengthened their ability to check
state regulatory actions, and reoriented them away from state-law claims and
toward cases presenting federal-law issues. Further, it blocked state efforts to
avoid the mandates of federal law or the jurisdiction and judgments of federal
courts, and it guaranteed access to a federal forum for all parties asserting
federal-law claims without regard for either their citizenship or their rights under
state law. In that context, Ex parte Young's significance emerges more clearly as
but one integral part of a complex reorientation of the federal judicial system.
III. UNDERSTANDING EXPARTE YOUNG: A PIECE OF THE CONTINENT,
A PART OF THE MAIN
Most broadly, and as a practical matter, Ex parte Young was important for
one simple and well-understood reason: it opened the doors of the federal courts
widely to suits seeking injunctions against state and local officials brought by
plaintiffs claiming injury from governmental actions that allegedly violated
federal law. It ensured that federal courts, not just state courts, could hear such
suits, and that in turn ensured that the federal courts would play a paramount role
in construing relevant federal law and guaranteeing that state and local officials
complied with its mandates. 175 For plaintiffs, Young provided ready access to a
highly preferred forum; for the federal courts, it provided a potentially sweeping
supervisory power over the other levels and branches of government.
As a technical and doctrinal matter, Young's significance was less clear and
more diffuse. In fact, while it drew on and helped develop the law in at least
eight different ways, none of its contributions was entirely new or wholly
172. See, e.g., Collins, Before Lochner, supra note 100, at 1304-15 (discussing the jurisdictional
shift from general common law to the Constitution).
173. E.g., Pa. R.R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1903); United States v. Thompson, 93
U.S. 586, 588-89 (1876); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 616-21 (1875).
174. Collins, Before Lochner, supra note 100, at 1304-06.
175. The Court subsequently termed the decision "the fountainhead of federal injunctions
against state prosecutions." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
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unprecedented. 176 In some areas it clarified the law and established principles
with a new firmness; in others its salience was more indirect and uncertain. In all
eight, however, it grew from and advanced the Court's transformation of the
federal courts.
First, and most famously, Young articulated a ruthlessly effective theory for
avoiding the Eleventh Amendment that became the Court's standard working
rationale. Whenever a state official acts in violation of the Constitution, "he is in
that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his
person to the consequences of his individual conduct." 177 The actor was, in short,
no longer an "official" but merely an "individual" and, hence, no longer within
the protection of the Eleventh Amendment.
1 78
Second, Young further limited the Eleventh Amendment by closing a
loophole in its "stripping" theory. Edward T. Young, Minnesota's attorney
general, had designed the state's rate statute carefully, insisting that it contain no
provision imposing an enforcement duty on any specific state official. 179 He did
so to bring the statute within the Court's ruling in Fitts v. McGhee,'80 an 1899
decision in which the Court dismissed a suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
1 8 1
Fitts had declared that an injunction would lie against state officials only when
the officials were "specially charged with the execution of a state enactment" and
took some otherwise wrongful action to enforce it.182 There was, Fitts explained,
"a wide difference" between, on the one hand, a suit where officials committed
"some positive act" that constituted "a wrong or trespass" and, on the other hand,
a suit against an officer who had no specific enforcement duty but sought only
"to test the constitutionality of a state statute" through "formal judicial
176. A law review article summarizing the law in 1900, for example, stated the relevant rules in
ways that were largely consistent with Young and its results, including use of identical language
about officers being "stripped of their official character." Joseph Wheless, Suits Against a State, 34
AM. L. REV. 689, 707 (1900). Indeed, the Court itself had used the same "stripping" language in
Ayers, 123 U.S. at 507. Both Ayers (at 499-500) and the Wheless article (at 707) also emphasized,
however, that relief was available only when state officials were "personally and individually
liable" for wrongful acts and thus were "mere trespassers." On the requirement of a legal wrong,
see infra text accompanying notes 188-194.
177. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908).
178. Id. In 1980, the Court stated that Young "decided that suits against state officials in federal
courts are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of
U.S., 446 U.S. 719, 737 (1980). It "clear[ed] the way for routine federal injunctions against
threatened enforcement of state laws." DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE
INJURY RULE 134 (1991).
179. RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE IRON HORSE AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RAILROADS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 144-45 (1993).
180. 172 U.S. 516 (1899). In his argument before the Court, Minnesota's attorney general
maintained that the "Circuit Court was without jurisdiction under Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516,
which cannot be distinguished, and to sustain the suit in Minnesota, it must be shown that Fitts v.
McGhee has been or should be overruled." Young, 209 U.S. at 138.
181. Fitts, 172 U.S. at 524.
182. Id. at 529.
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proceedings in the courts of the State."'183 Officials taking the former course
could be enjoined; those taking the latter could not.184
Discussing Fitts at length, Young distinguished it on the ground that the
officials in the prior case had "no duty at all with regard to the act, and could not
be properly made parties to the suit."1 85  In contrast, Young explained,
Minnesota's attorney general had a "general duty" under state law to enforce the
rate statute, a duty that "sufficiently connected him with the duty of enforcement
to make him a proper party."' 86 More important, Young in effect overruled the
apparent holding in Fitts that an injunction should not issue in the absence of an
independent wrong or trespass and that the bare effort to enforce a law by
bringing a single test action was not, by itself, a wrong sufficient to support a
federal equity suit.
87
Third, Young implied a federal cause of action directly under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 88 The fact that the attorney general had committed no common-
law trespass meant that he had committed no independent legal wrong capable of
supporting a traditional common-law action. 89 The only possible wrong he had
committed, then, was his attempt to enforce through a state judicial proceeding a
statute alleged to be unconstitutional.' 9" That attempt, Young held, was the
equivalent of a traditional common-law wrong and was, therefore, sufficient by
itself to support a cause of action.' 9' Thus, Young dispensed with the
requirement of a common-law trespass or other independent legal wrong that had
traditionally been necessary to support a cause of action against a government
official. 92 It made the bare attempt to enforce an unconstitutional act through a
lawful and non-trespassory judicial proceeding sufficient to support plaintiffs
183. Id. at 529-30.
184. Id. at 530.
185. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 158 (1908).
186. Id. at 161.
187. See, e.g., id. at 158-59 (noting that "[a]n injunction to prevent [a state officer] from doing
that which he has no legal right to do is not an interference with the discretion of [that officer]").
188. While Young altered the law in discarding the requirement of an independent legal wrong,
it did not initiate the practice of implying private rights of action from the Constitution. The Court
had previously done so, allowing both injunctive relief and suits for damages as remedies for
constitutional violations. See, e.g., Collins, Economic Rights, supra note 100, at 1517-25;
Woolhandler, supra note 11, at 448-49.
189. Young, 209 U.S. at 167.
190. Id. at 158.
191. The Court seemed, in effect, to overrule In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), which held that
the mere threat of a single lawsuit seeking to enforce a statute did not justify the intervention of
federal equity. Id. at 506-07. See also Woolhandler & Collins, State Standing, supra note 100, at
460 n.283.
192. See, e.g., Fitts v. McGee, 172 U.S. 516, 529 (1899); In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 190 (1893);
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 10 (1891). For discussions of the traditional requirements,
see generally CUR.RIE, supra note 5, at 50-54; Collins, Economic Rights, supra note 100, at 1511-
17. On the complexity of nineteenth-century law dealing with suits against state officers and the
ways in which the law evolved prior to Young, see Woolhandler, supra note 11, at 432-44.
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suit. 193 Consequently, it made the claim of an alleged constitutional violation, by
itself, the basis of plaintiffs right of action. 
194
Fourth, by recognizing a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment,
Young provided an automatic basis for the federal courts to assert subject-matter
jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to state actions 95 and to avoid the bar
193. Young, 209 U.S. at 156-58. "The threat to commence those suits under such circumstances
was therefore necessarily held to be equivalent to any other threatened wrong or injury to the
property of plaintiff which had theretofore been held sufficient to authorize the suit against the
officer." Id. at 158. See also Woolhandler, supra note 11, at 441-42.
194. The Court made its doctrinal move painfully explicit when it attempted to root its
reasoning in precedent.
[J]urisdiction of this general character has, in fact, been exercised by Federal courts from the
time of Osborn v. United States Bank [22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)] up to the present: the
only difference in regard to the case of Osborn and the case in hand being that in this case the
injury complained of is the threatened commitment of suits, civil or criminal, to enforce the
act, instead of, as in the Osborn case [sic], an actual and direct trespass upon or interference
with tangible property.
Young, 209 U.S. at 167. The Court then signaled its innovation, as courts often do, by explicitly
denying it.
A bill filed to prevent the commencement of suits to enforce an unconstitutional act, under the
circumstances already mentioned, is no new invention, as we have already seen. The
difference between an actual and direct interference with tangible property and the enjoining
of state officers from enforcing an unconstitutional act, is not of a radical nature, and does
not extend, in truth, the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter.
Id. (emphasis added). To cap its effort, the Court repeated its equation of an actual trespass with
the initiation of an enforcement action, asserted that the "sovereignty of the State is, in reality, no
more involved in one case than in the other," and denied that the Eleventh Amendment protected a
state in either case. Id. Then, stretching for the cover of precedent once again, it cited as authority
for that last assertion-of all cases-In re Ayers. Id. Ayers was not only one of the pillars of the
post-Reconstruction effort to broaden the Eleventh Amendment and limit the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, but it was also a case that Young was in the process of effectively overruling.
Finding an action against state officials barred by the Eleventh Amendment, Ayers had also
identified Osborn as recognizing the traditional basis on which a court could issue an injunction
against state officials-the commission of a common law tort:
There is nothing, therefore, in the judgment in that cause [Osborn], as finally determined,
which extends its authority beyond the prevention and restraint of the specific act done in
pursuance of the unconstitutional statute of Ohio, and in violation of the act of Congress
chartering the bank, which consisted of the unlawful seizure and detention of its property. It
was conceded throughout the case, in the argument at the bar and in the opinion of the court,
that an action at law would lie, either of trespass or detinue, against the defendants as
individual trespassers guilty of a wrong in taking the property of the complainant illegally.
Ayers, 123 U.S. at 499 (emphasis added). See also Woolhandler & Collins, State Standing, supra
note 100, at 460-62.
195. There was no basis for invoking diversity jurisdiction in the underlying federal suit
challenging the state statute, and the Court specifically found several federal questions sufficient to
support the lower court's general federal-question jurisdiction. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
143-45 (1908).
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of the well-pleaded-complaint rule.' 9 6  The latter rule limited federal-question
jurisdiction to actions in which a sufficient federal-law issue appeared on the face
of a properly pleaded complaint as a necessary element of plaintiffs cause of
action.' 9 Prior to Young, plaintiffs suing government officials had to plead a
common-law cause of action and resorted to the Constitution only in reply to
negate an official's defense of lawful authority.19 8 Such a responsive invocation
of federal law did not satisfy the well-pleaded-complaint rule, and hence prior to
Young such actions did not come within general federal-question jurisdiction.' 99
By establishing a specifically federal cause of action, however, Young in effect
required plaintiffs to plead the constitutional violation in their complaint and
thereby brought their claims within the well-pleaded-complaint rule and,
consequently, within general federal-question jurisdiction.2 °°
Fifth, Young broadened the federal courts' ability to enjoin state criminal
prosecutions. Acknowledging as a general matter that "equity has no jurisdiction
to enjoin criminal proceedings," the Court hastily added that "there are
exceptions. '20 1 When a criminal prosecution was "brought to enforce an alleged
unconstitutional statute," and the statute was challenged "in a suit already
pending in a Federal court," the court could properly enjoin the appropriate
party-"even though a state official"-from continuing the criminal prosecution
until the federal equity court had disposed of the case before it.20 2  Such
injunctive relief was particularly appropriate, Young added, citing Smyth v. Ames
among other cases, "'where property rights will [otherwise] be destroyed.' 20 3
Sixth, Young advanced a line of reasoning that anticipated, and likely helped
inspire, the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" that the Court began to
articulate two years later.204 If states imposed "conditions" on a legal right that
were "so onerous and impractical" that they essentially negated that right, Young
stated, such oppressive conditions could be unconstitutional.2 5 The Minnesota
196. See Tennessee v. Union & Planters Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 461 (1894); Metcalf v.
Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 589 (1888); Donald L. Doemberg, There's No Reason For It; It's Just
Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 601-07, 611-26 (1987); Hill, Constitutional Remedies, supra
note 5, at 1128-36.
197. Hill, supra note 5, at 1128.
198. Id.
199. In terms of the well-pleaded-complaint rule, there is reason to question the extent of
Young's impact in equity suits as opposed to actions at law. In equity, pleading rules were more
flexible and required plaintiff to provide a more complete account of the underlying dispute, and
federal equity courts sometimes required plaintiffs to identify anticipated defenses and the nature of
their proposed reply in their complaints. Collins, Economic Right, supra note 100, at 1514-17; Hill,
supra note 5, at 1128-36.
200. "The question that arises is whether there is a remedy that the parties interested may resort
to, by going into a Federal court of equity, in a case involving a violation of the Federal
Constitution." Young, 209 U.S. at 149.
201. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161 (1908).
202. Id. at 161-63.
203. Id. at 162 (quoting Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 239, 241 (1904)).
204. See HENDERSON, supra note 60, ch. 8; Hale, supra note 60, at 335-41.
205. Young, 209 U.S. at 147.
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rate statute "indirectly accomplishes a like result by imposing such conditions
upon the right to appeal for judicial relief' that parties would prefer to abandon
the right "rather than face the conditions upon which it is offered or may be
obtained., 20 6  Its "penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and
imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the company and its officers from
resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation. 20 7 The statute was,
therefore, unconstitutional.20 8 Thus, Young's reasoning foreshadowed, and likely
helped spur, the Court's development of general "unconstitutional conditions"
doctrine between 1910 and 1916.
Seventh, Young broadened the reach of federal equity by narrowing the
concept of an "adequate remedy at law., 20 9  Ordinarily, a party's ability to
challenge a statute in an enforcement proceeding would constitute an adequate
remedy at law, but the statute's severe sanctions-which the Court ruled
"unconstitutional on their face"-made it unlikely that the railroads in Young
would dare to violate it.210 Thus, the opportunity to defend against a prosecution
did not provide the railroads with an adequate remedy at law. More compelling,
federal equity jurisdiction was also arguably lacking because the railroads could
have challenged the rate law without violating it by appearing in the state-court
mandamus proceeding that the attorney general had initiated. 211  The Court,
however, was hardly satisfied with that. It denied the adequacy of such a remedy
by citing a series of reasons why defending such an action would pose practical
risks and dangers, including the contention that a jury "could not intelligently
pass upon" matters in such a "complicated" rate-making case.212  The Court
simply ignored the fact that the attorney general's mandamus action in state court
provided an immediate legal remedy that would minimize or eliminate most of
the practical dangers--other than the constitutionally dubious "danger" of




209. Here, again, Young was not unprecedented. The Court "in a series of cases decided since
Ayers had already allowed suits against officers who had done nothing more than threaten suit
under statutes attacked as unconstitutional." Those cases, however, represented "essentially
unreasoned departures" from Ayers, and Young rationalized them by analogizing the threats as
equivalent to trespasses. David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government
Officers, 1984 SUP. CT. REv. 149, 154.
210. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148 (1908).
211. Id. at 133-34.
212. Id. at 163-65. "All the objections to a remedy at law as being plainly inadequate are
obviated by a suit in equity." Id. at 165.
213. The Court emphasized that the severity of the penalties the statute imposed could easily
dissuade anyone from daring to violate it in order to test it judicially, id. at 163-65, but Young's
mandamus action largely obviated such dangers. Indeed, the state's attorney general was obviously
making a serious effort to bring the statute to a judicial test. Thus, the real issue presented was not
whether there would be a quick judicial resolution but, rather, whether a federal or a state court
would decide the issue and whether a jury would be involved in making the decision. The Court
seemingly sought to obscure the crucial battle over forum control that lay at the heart of the
litigation by a sweeping statement that seemed irrelevant, if not disingenuous. "The courts having
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important, by stressing the dangers and infirmities of a jury in a ratemaking case,
the Court encouraged corporate plaintiffs to seek relief in federal equity courts
where they could avoid juries and, further, provided the lower federal courts with
a new and pliable ground on which to grant their wishes.
Finally, Young's analysis of the unconstitutional conditions that the
Minnesota statute imposed carried two potentially far-reaching implications: one
was that parties had a "right" of access to a judicial forum to challenge a state's
allegedly wrongful actions; the other was that the Due Process Clause limited the
power of the states to deny aggrieved parties access to such a forum.214 The
Court neither explained the nature and scope of such a right of access nor
identified the extent of due-process protection, but its reasoning suggested the
fundamental principle that the Constitution required some relatively unfettered
access to a judicial forum-possibly even to a federal court-to challenge
government impositions. That principle would resonate through the subsequent
history of American constitutional law, never fully and finally accepted by the
Court but persistently inspiring efforts to ensure the availability of effective
judicial protections against governmental wrongdoing.215
Thus, Young carried forward the Court's transformation of the federal courts
on a wide front. It clarified and solidified critical doctrines that served to expand
the role of the federal courts in protecting federal rights and controlling the
actions of the other levels and branches of government, especially those of the
states. It was a flower of that broad transformation, and its meaning and
significance are most fully and accurately understood only in that context.
Young's key role in the transformation was apparent, too, in the defensive
note the Court struck at the opinion's conclusion. "There is nothing in the case
before us," it declared, "that ought properly to breed hostility to the customary
operation of Federal courts of justice in cases of this character., 21 6 Although the
statement was striking in its express admission of Young's controversial social
import, it was more revealing in its implicit admission of Young's pivotal legal
significance. Earlier in its opinion, the Court had sought to justify its decision by
invoking a broad principle: "The courts having jurisdiction, Federal or state,
should at all times be open" to those seeking to protect "their property and their
legal rights. 217  The Court's concluding caution that a "customary operation"
should not "breed hostility," however, did not repeat the earlier reference to all
courts, "Federal or state." Rather, it referred only to the former. While Young
could be justified in theory as securing a right of access to courts generally, in
other words, the decision was-as a matter of historical fact-only about
jurisdiction, Federal or state, should at all times be open" to those seeking to protect "their
property and their legal rights." Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 181.
215. Compare, for example, the majority opinion in Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-600
(1988) (suggesting a constitutional dimension to the question whether complainant had a right to
bring his claim of government wrongdoing to a federal court) with Justice Scalia's dissent, id at
606-21 (denying a general constitutional right to a judicial forum, especially to a federal forum).
216. Young, 209 U.S. at 168.
217 Id at 165
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securing access to a federal court. That was a central goal of the transformation,
and the justices who decided Young and shaped the transformation understood
and embraced that goal full well.
218
IV. CONCLUSION: YOUNG AND SOME LESSONS OF THE TRANSFORMATION
Considering Exparte Young in the transformation's context suggests several
conclusions. Perhaps most obvious, it shows that "Progressives" and their like
were hardly the primary, let alone sole, force driving the processes of
nationalization and centralization that remade American law, government, and
society in the decades around the turn of the century. 2 19 Rather, it was for the
most part national business groups, the anti-Progressive wing of the Republican
Party, and an emerging nationally oriented social and economic class that
nourished the national market, structured the new centralizing corporate
economy, and pressed for the efficiencies and protections they saw in uniform
national law.220 In the process, they supported the expansion of both federal law
and the enforcement capabilities of the national courts.
Recognizing the nature of the transformation also shows that the enduring
achievement of the turn-of-the-century Court was not political or economic but
institutional. Above all, it expanded the scope and content of federal law,
strengthened the ability of the federal courts to enforce that law, and established
more firmly the primacy of the federal judiciary in authoritatively construing a
supreme national law. It did not so much impose broad or severe limits on
legislative power as it expanded the federal judiciary's ability to regularly
supervise and, when necessary, check specific exercises of that power, especially
218. In dissent, Harlan made the significance of the Court's ruling inescapable when he pointed
to the alternative principle that Young rejected: "Surely, the right of a State to invoke the
jurisdiction of its own courts is not less than the right of individuals to invoke the jurisdiction of a
Federal court." Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 182 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
219. Contra, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006).
Historians and political scientists have demonstrated that the processes of nationalization and
centralization had roots deep in the nineteenth century antedating both Progressivism and the New
Deal. See, e.g., RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL STATE
AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859-1877 (1990); MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN
LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1977); CHARLES G. SELLERS, JR., THE MARKET
REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815-1846 (1991); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS
AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992); STEPHEN
SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE
CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982); William E. Forbath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, 1870-
1920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 634-96 (Michael Grossberg &
Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
220. The judiciary acted "largely in response to national-class needs." ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-
RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 148 (1995). Examining the attitudes of
the Justices, Morton J. Horwitz distinguished between "old" conservatives who were suspicious of
the new corporate economy and committed to maintaining governmental decentralization, and
"new" conservatives who welcomed the new corporate economy and the legal nationalization that
followed. HORWITZ, supra note 137, at chs. 1 & 3. The achievement of the turn-of-the-century
Court was largely to institutionalize the attitudes of the "new" conservatives.
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by the states.22' Thus, the turn-of-the-century Court strengthened the role of the
federal judiciary in American government and shifted power along both of the
Constitution's structural axes: on one, from the states to the nation and, on the
other, from all the levels and branches of government to the federal judiciary.222
More broadly, the transformation illustrated the dynamic and rebalancing
nature of the American constitutional structure.223 Massive social and economic
changes across the nation and world radically altered the most basic conditions of
life, demanding responses from all governmental institutions as well as a new
activism on the part of the federal government.224 Those social changes and
governmental responses brought the increasing nationalization and centralization
of law, and that development in turn generated new demands for a national check
221. By one count, between 1874 and 1898 the Court struck down a total of 12 federal and 125
state statutes, and between 1898 and 1937 it voided approximately 50 federal and more than 400
state statutes. ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 511 (5th ed. 1976). By other counts, between 1887 and 1911 the Court
used the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce and Contract Clauses to strike down state laws
in 73 cases (out of a total of 862 cases reviewing state laws), and between 1890 and 1919 it voided
federal laws in 23 cases (out of a total of 158 cases reviewing federal laws). Whittington, supra
note 40, at 830-32. Two conclusions are clear. One is that the Court allowed the overwhelming
number of both state and federal statutes to stand, and the other is that it did impose some
significant limitations on Congress and, especially, the states. Based on those counts, after 1890
the Court voided an average of approximately one federal law and something between four and ten
state laws every year. Some of the invalidations involved broad social and economic issues of high
political visibility, and many in effect negated similar laws in other states that were not technically
before the Court and helped block passage of yet other measures proposed or under active
legislative consideration. For another discussion of the issue, see Melvin 1. Urofsky, Myth and
Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective Legislation in the Progressive Era, 1983 Y.B. SuP. CT.
HIST. Soc'Y 53.
222. PURCELL, supra note 27, at 39-40. Professor Woolhandler argued that Young and the
availability of general federal-question jurisdiction "did not fundamentally alter the role of the
federal courts so much as they gradually changed the labels under which litigants continued to do
what they had done in the past." Woolhandler, Common Law Origins, supra note 100, at 81.
Somewhat similarly, Professor John Harrison contended that Young created "no exception, no
fiction, no new cause of action, and no paradox" and represented the simple exercise of"a standard
tool of equity." John Harrison, Ex parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 990 (2008). In
emphasizing, respectively, a shift in "labels" and the continuity of doctrines, both scholars obscured
Young's primary historical significance, its integral role in the transformation of the federal courts.
The turn-of-the-century Court changed the scope and substance of federal law, expanded the power
of Congress and the president, and altered fundamental ideas about the federal judicial power. It
altered the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, the role and jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts, and the relationship between the federal courts and the other levels and branches of
government, especially the state courts. Further, it changed the tactics of litigants, the social
patterns of public and private litigation, and the practical impact that national law and the federal
courts had on the operations of the American legal and political system. Young was a key element
in those changes. Thus, Young did far more than merely change labels, and its alleged doctrinal
consistency evidenced not the true historical significance of the case but the pliability of legal
reasoning and the subtle and often disguised means through which the law remakes itself over time.
223. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY chs. 7 & 10 (2007).
224. See FREYER, supra note 26, at 99-114; Gillman, supra note 26, at 512-19; McCurdy, supra
note 26, at 648-49.
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on government actions of all kinds. Between 1890 and 1917 the Supreme Court
responded to those complex changes and the demands they placed on the
institutions of American government by developing a responsive national law
and laying the foundations for a broadened judicial power capable of challenging,
channeling, and checking the other increasingly active and intrusive institutions
of government.
Young and the transformation of the federal courts immediately provoked
critics and inspired defenders, and they have continued to do so ever since. 2 5
Though many of the arguments for and against both have remained the same, the
values and purposes that the arguments served have repeatedly shifted with the
times. The changing views of Young and the transformation reveal the extent to
which readapting and realigning branch affinities-the political and ideological
biases that different groups have toward the various levels and branches of
government-shaped conflicting interpretations of the basic principles of
American law, especially those involving the fundamental but imprecise and
evolving concepts of federalism and separation of powers.226 Thus, Young and
the transformation-and the evolving ways in which later generations have
interpreted them-cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of the
dynamics of constitutional interpretation and the powerful role that conflicting
and shifting branch affinities play. Indeed, an understanding of those dynamics
demonstrates the ultimate flaw that threatens all prescriptive theories of
American constitutional government that attempt to portray its complex
operations as timeless and specifically determined: life changes, and the nature
and scope of the power that appeared desirable in one level or branch of
government at one time and with some purposes and conditions in mind comes to
seem no longer desirable at a later time with other conditions and purposes in
mind. Such life changes often seem to require the rebalancing of the levels and
branches of government and the shackling or elimination of some checks or the
expansion and development of others. Accordingly, while the branch affinities
and consequent constitutional theories of each generation's partisans may be
relatively stable, those of later generations are commonly different. Famously,
Young was an oppressive barrier to Progressives but a magic key for the Civil
Rights Movement.
22 7
225. E.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); Louis BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932); Fiss, supra
note 10; GILBERT ROE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY (1912); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). In the late twentieth and early twenty-first
century, much of the disagreement over Young's significance focused on whether it could and
should be used to support broad "structural" injunctions intended to change the operations of
governmental institutions. Compare, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The
Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Reform Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980),
with SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 23, at ch. 4.
226. PURCELL, supra note 223, at 6-8.
227. "Ironically, Ex Parte Young [sic], the bete noire of liberals in the writer's law school days,
has become 'the fountainhead' of federal power to enforce the Civil Rights Act." HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 2 n.7 (1973). See Solimine, supra note 7, for
a similar example of the changing social significance of a judicial institution.
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Those considerations suggest, in turn, that the most illuminating service that
legal history can provide is not primarily the examination of doctrines and
principles but the study of the relationship of those doctrines and principles to the
values, purposes, practices, social interests, institutional considerations,
competing ideological formations, and contemporaneous and anticipated
consequences that inspire and shape them.228 As the contrasting opinions of
Justices Peckham and Harlan illustrated, Young can be shown as a doctrinal
matter to be either highly traditional or quite radical. Indeed, even when Young
is accepted as rooted in precedent, its doctrinal language can be used to support
either a broad or a narrow conception of federal judicial power. 229 Thus, though
surely important, doctrine itself seems ultimately a highly dependent element of
the law. When legal historians focus on it too tightly or exclusively, they miss
much, if not most, of the significance of cases and much, if not most, of the legal
230system's operations.
228. Cf Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REV. 1945, 1066-83 (2001) (outlining a positive theory explaining the way social, political,
and institutional processes change constitutional meanings).
229. Compare, for example, the interpretations of Professors Woolhandler and Harrison. Both
stress Young's continuity with the past and minimize the extent to which it changed the law.
Professor Woolhandler concluded that her findings show "a historically settled consensus that the
federal courts should administer a federalized set of rights and remedies for federal constitutional
rights" and thus supports "the legitimacy of 'activist' Supreme Courts' expanding the use of federal
question jurisdiction and [section] 1983." Woolhandler, Common Law Origins, supra note 100, at
81. Professor Harrison also sees Young in minimalist terms, as little more than an ordinary
example of the long-established "anti-suit injunction." In contrast to Woolhandler, however, he
concluded that "Young itself does not imply constitutional duties, claim-rights, or causes of action"
and, consequently, that it provides no support for an active federal judiciary or for any authority to
imply private rights of action for constitutional violations. Harrison, supra note 222, at 1021.
230. The debate over "Lochner revisionism" illustrates many of the same points. Progressives
were scathing in their indictments of Lochner and insisted that it made a radical break with
traditional principles. When "substantive due process" took on a different social and political
significance later in the twentieth century, however, many of their liberal descendants began to
view the case anew and discovered Lochner's roots in traditional values, ideas, and doctrines. See,
e.g., Jack M. Balkin, 'Wrong the Day It Was Decided': Lochner and Constitutional Historicism,"
85 B.U. L. REV. 677 (2005); Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 221 (1999); Stephen A. Siegel, The Revision Thickens, 20 LAW & HIST. REv. 631 (2002).
The practical truth is that Lochner's meaning depends in large part on what changing historical
contexts inspire different commentators to try to do with it, and over time most interpretations
reflect those contextual changes and the commentators' ideological convictions. Compare, e.g.,
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAWS 98-112 (1992) (arguing that the "libertarian framework" of Lochner would invalidate racial
segregation laws), with Karlan, supra note 14, at 794-809 (showing that Lochner's sweeping and
abstract principles were, in fact, ignored when racial discrimination cases came to the Court).
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